History Nerd Thread

[The Human Q-Tip]

I too have had a change of heart on the issue over the years as more information has become available.

I wonder what the other side of the argument thinks. @The Human Q-Tip, what is your opinion on the use of atomic weapons on Japan?

Well, I'll first respond to your question with one of my own: when you say:

I too have had a change of heart on the issue over the years as more information has become available....

Are you referring to information that was known to the U.S. government at the time it made the decision, or to information regarding internal deliberations within Japan? Because I think the merits of our decision can only be judged fairly by what we actually knew at the time.

Do I think we would have used the Bomb on Hamburg, Dresden or Berlin? Probably not (and yes I used those cities specifically as an example).

The only real point of comparison we have is the fire-bombing raids, and we didn't seem any more averse to fire-bombing the white Aryans in Dresden than we did the yellow Asians in Tokyo.

In the event Germany still had a viable chance at holding out by August 1945 (see Alpine Redoubt) I think a demonstration detonation on someplace like Helgoland would have occurred rather than nuking a major city.

I'd agree that we wouldn't have nuked a major city, but under the "Alpine Redoubt" strategy, we'd have likely already controlled all their major cities anyway. The reality of Japan as a heavily fortified island nation, and not just a nation having one region of defensible mountains, has to be taken into account.

To put it differently, if the Germans and Hitler had a heavily fortified Alpine redoubt that included a major city, Hitler was holed up in it, and still refused to surrender, I think we may well have dropped one on that major city to end it. And even that isn't a perfect analogy because in that scenario, the Germans would essentially be confined to that one redoubt, and be defeated everywhere else. With Japan, there were still Japanese troops fighting on mainland Asia, and Japanese subs sinking American ships. Lives were being lost every day the war went on even if there was no invasion.

Julius Rosenberg was well hung.

No wonder Ethel went along with it.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Alright...

I think part of it was payback for Pearl Harbor, and have never believed that the bombs were ever intended to be dropped on Central Europe if that theater lingered on, like some historians believe.

The two situations were so different militarily that it is really difficult to draw comparisons. The war with Germany was more or less a traditional land war in which reasonable progress could be anticipated and expected. But the island-hopping campaign against Japan was unique to that point in history -- repeated, incredibly bloody assaults on heavily fortified islands against a foe who rarely surrendered. And I think it is impossible to separate how that military campaign progressed from our respective attitudes towards the Germans and Japanese at the end of the war. We viewed them differently in part because the nature of the war was so different.

I think there were racial undertones as to why we dropped the bomb on Japan.

I'd agree there was racism against the Japanese in general. Honestly not sure it had any significant impact on the decision to drop the nukes, or even how the war was actually fought period.

No way would we have dropped them on whites from countries many American's immigrated from.

I don't think that can be known. Had it been Germans defending those islands to virtually the last man and engaging in that kind of conduct, and had it been Hitler on the Home Islands promising to never surrender, I think we may well have made the same decision.

That belief was only strengthened with what U.S. Army personnel saw and told U.S. politicians about; kamikazes, banzai charges, Japanese soldiers surrendering to U.S. soldiers only to blow themselves up once they got to U.S. lines with grenades, scarring Okinawa citizens to the point that they killed themselves with the belief that we would rape and murder all of them, etc. So what was the harm in dropping the worlds first atomic weapon on these people U.S. leaders and citizens viewed as subhuman savages at the time? We were racist to our own citizens during this time period...I don't think its too far-fetched to think racism played a role in this as well.

This kind of illustrates the point I was making above. You are describing accurately the horrible way in which the Japanese prosecuted that war -- it wasn't racist to point out what the Japanese were doing and condemn it, even if it was expressed in racist terms. And if that conduct fostered/amplified whatever latent racism already existed, it was still ultimately the way in which the Japanese decided to wage that war -- their actual conduct that you accurately described -- that primarily determined how they were viewed.

I think part of it was to send a message to the USSR. Keep in mind that the Normandy Invasion (D-Day) was pushed to go through a small gap in bad weather because Eisenhower, Montgomery, and the rest of the Allied high command knew how long it would take for the right tides to return for a seaborne invasion to be successful and all the obstacles the Germans placed on the shores of France needed to be exposed at dawn...and in that time, had they delayed the attack another month+, the Soviet's would have gained a huge head start on U.S., British, Canadian, and Free French and Polish forces..

With respect to the invasion of Normandy as evidence that we were really just trying to forestall the Soviets, I think it should be remembered that the message the USSR and Stalin were sending to the western Allies was "get off your asses and invade as soon as possible. So I think it may be a bit of after the fact Cold War projection obscuring what was still the primary concern in 1944 -- defeating the Germans. If the Soviets themselves were a lot more concerned about actually beating the Germans than us gaining a foothold on the continent, they sure didn't act like it.

So while what the world would be like after the war was something that was certainly considered at some level, I don't think that affected Ike's decision-making on the invasion. And in fact, he was actually less aggressive in limiting the Soviet advance in 1945 than many others thought he should have been -- he didn't want to expend American lives just to keep a few more miles of ground away from the Soviets.

It's why I think we dropped leaflets on Japan prior to dropping the 2nd bomb, because we knew it had no legit military reasoning. So once we showed we had multiple bombs capable of massive destruction never seen before, I'm sure it got Stalin thinking more than a one time drop would have...we weren't fucking around, and the 2nd bomb on Nagasaki said that to the Soviets.

But it also said that to the Japanese, so how do we know that was not the primary intent?.

I'm not sure I will ever believe in the stereotypical trope that we teach in America about the bombings. That it was "to end the war as soon as possible and save countless Allied and Japanese soldiers, as well as Japanese citizens from the results of a mainland Japan invasion".

Would you agree that the cost in both U.S., Japanese, and other lives of an invasion -- or even of the war dragging on for longer in China, blockading of Japan, etc.. was a major factor considered when discussing whether or not to drop the bomb, even if you don't believe it was the most important factor? Because I don't think it is remotely credible to think that Roosevelt, Truman, Marshall, etc. were not concerned about the cost in U.S. lives (at least) of the war dragging on for longer.

The fire bombing that was taking place in Japan the months leading up to Hiroshima had Japanese high command already on the verge of unconditional surrender...the only hurdle left to cross was the Hirohito business, and I think another month or 2 of fire bombing major cities could have accomplished the same outcome...

Another month of two of fire bombings would have cost the lives of a lot more American aircrews. More sailors would have died, more Allied troops would have died on the Asian mainland, etc.. Why should we endure that when we had the means to (hopefully) end the war with one more bombing raid?

I'd also point out the cost to the Japanese. As everyone knows, more Japanese died in the Tokyo firebombing raids than in either of the nuke blasts. A couple more months of fire bombings likely would have cost a lot more lives than what the nukes took. And, there was the issue of the continued blockade, and the suffering of the Japanese people.

Just as a final thing about Hirohito. Part of the circumstances that led to WW@ in the first place was the German belief/mythology that they had not really been defeated in WWI, but rather "stabbed in the back" by traitors at home. That memory was undoubtedly stronger in 1945 than it is today, and the people making decisions at the time did not want a repeat of that myth to sow the seeds for another war in either theater, which is why we demanded unconditional surrender in both theaters. Truman was a WWI combat veteran himself, so the idea of "we have to fight them again because we didn't end it right the first time" was likely part of his thinking.

Having Hirohito himself publicly acknowledge defeat was part of ensuring that the fact of defeat would be acknowledge throughout all elements of Japanese society. That was also likely a major concern given that we knew we were about to embark on an extended occupation, and would not want to be dealing with a guerilla resistance by dead-enders who refused to concede defeat.

 

[GreasySpread36]

I think part of it was payback for Pearl Harbor, and have never believed that the bombs were ever intended to be dropped on Central Europe if that theater lingered on, like some historians believe. I think there were racial undertones as to why we dropped the bomb on Japan. Keep in mind this was the 1940s, and most people viewed Asians, and especially Japanese Asians, as subhuman in nature. No way would we have dropped them on whites from countries many American's immigrated from. That belief was only strengthened with what U.S. Army personnel saw and told U.S. politicians about; kamikazes, banzai charges, Japanese soldiers surrendering to U.S. soldiers only to blow themselves up once they got to U.S. lines with grenades, scarring Okinawa citizens to the point that they killed themselves with the belief that we would rape and murder all of them, etc. So what was the harm in dropping the worlds first atomic weapon on these people U.S. leaders and citizens viewed as subhuman savages at the time? We were racist to our own citizens during this time period...I don't think its too far-fetched to think racism played a role in this as well...

Disagree with the bolded. Keep in mind how many of the scientists who developed the Bomb were Jewish and/or refugees from Hitler's Europe. Also keep in mind that there was a real fear that Hitler would develop the Bomb before we did. The Bomb was originally developed with Germany in mind, not Japan. I think we absolutely would have dropped that thing on Germany if we felt we had to. We had no qualms about firebombing German cities or leaving German civilians to the tender mercies of the Red Army, after all.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Couple of things I'd point out..

1) Allied forces, including both Roosevelt Administration as informed by General MacArthur, and the Soviets informed directly by the Japanese delegation, knew unequivocally that the Japanese government (including the military) were amicable to the exact same terms that were ultimately accepted after the bombings. This was known no later than early January 1945.

From what I've read, there was not unanimity within the Japanese government on that issue, and we knew that as well. There was a peace faction, but also a war faction. Guys like Alperovitz tend to minimize and discount that, but other authors have produced some pretty good evidence on that point. And ultimately, the Japanese retained nothing more than the Emperor, and had to give up many of the other demands included in their earlier peace feelers.

And look, saying that those were the exact same terms eventually accepted (which is not entirely correct) is applying hindsight. I think both Roosevelt and Truman (a WW1 vet himself) truly believed that an unconditional surrender was the best way to avoid future wars. Maybe they were wrong, but I think that belief was honestly held. And it should be remembered that they did get their unconditional surrender from the Germans, so they likely believed they could get it from Japan as well.

The fact that Truman permitted the Japanese to retain the Emperor after the bombs were dropped doesn't show that wasn't really the motive -- it just shows that after playing the two best cards in his hand and being unable to get that unconditional surrender, he decided that letting the Emperor stay wasn't worth the cost in U.S. lives to keep fighting. But he didn't know the Japanese would still refuse to give up their Emperor after the bombs were dropped until we actually dropped the bombs.

 

[Jordan]

Okay, so I really see both sides of the issue:

First, as @The Human Q-Tip noted, we can't look at information that was unknown or unforeseeable at the time. So, for example, I've seen arguments that the usage of the nuclear bomb at the end of WWII resulted in U.S. enemies fracturing. And this, in turn, has led to terrorism. Regardless of the validity of that argument, there was no way to predict that would happen, so it should not be considered in the debate.

The best record for this info, in my opinion, occurs in the U.S. FRUS documents, where the detail discussions in the USFG. The argument Truman and his advisors made was that, in using the nuclear bombs, we'll end the war and ultimately save lives. Discounting the necessity of using two bombs - which, I believe, was to send a message to the Soviets that we had more than one bomb - I do understand where the USFG was coming from. A lot of intelligence from military commanders suggested the Japanese would still be fighting unless we utterly crushed them, consequently, I really do empathize with Truman's decision.

With that said, from a moral level, I'm always concerned with creating mass destruction. The question becomes, could the United States have ended the war without a nuclear weapon being dropped? And moreover, what would the costs have been had they not used the weapon? The issue is, immediate human life destruction is not the only impact. The usage of the nuclear weapon threw significant fuel in the Cold War's fire, making it escalate much quicker, and resulting in many small wars right after WWII. This was a foreseeable impact, especially after Truman's meeting with Stalin, and for me that was costly.

Ultimately, I don't really know where I stand. I can see both sides and I think both have fair arguments. I'm looking forward to reading the rest of this discussion.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

The usage of the nuclear weapon threw significant fuel in the Cold War's fire, making it escalate much quicker, and resulting in many small wars right after WWII. This was a foreseeable impact, especially after Truman's meeting with Stalin, and for me that was costly.

Forgetting the actual use of the nuclear weapon on Japan, wouldn't the same effect on the Cold War have happened if we'd have done a demonstration blast? And suppose we hadn't done it all...the Soviets still knew that we were working on the bomb, and suspected we might have one. So wouldn't they have continued working on it after the war, developed one of their own, and then done their own blasts anyway?

I just think we would probably have ended up in roughly the same place anyway.

 

[gourimoko]

A couple of counter points to add to @BimboColesHair 's point.

The two situations were so different militarily that it is really difficult to draw comparisons. The war with Germany was more or less a traditional land war in which reasonable progress could be anticipated and expected. But the island-hopping campaign against Japan was unique to that point in history -- repeated, incredibly bloody assaults on heavily fortified islands against a foe who rarely surrendered. And I think it is impossible to separate how that military campaign progressed from our respective attitudes towards the Germans and Japanese at the end of the war. We viewed them differently in part because the nature of the war was so different.

Well, we did have quite a few projections with respect to progress in the war, particularly in late 1944, early 1945. It was the majority opinion of the American military command that Japan would surrender (without invasion), no later than November 1945.

When consulted, General Eisenhower had strongly advised against the use of nuclear weapons on the basis that it was completely unnecessary; the Japanese were going to surrender without a land invasion - "they had already been defeated."

Again, I don't think we can simultaneously acknowledge the fact that the Japanese were motioning for surrender, repeatedly since January, and that the American government was aware of this; while then considering the complexities/difficulties of invading the main islands of Japan.

What exactly would we be invading for? To depose the Emperor, and that's it?

So this brings us back to the more likely, and more historically accurate (imho) opinion, that the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Japan for the aforementioned reasons by myself and @BimboColesHair .

I'd agree there was racism against the Japanese in general. Honestly not sure it had any significant impact on the decision to drop the nukes, or even how the war was actually fought period.

I think it did. For the reasons @King Stannis pointed out; the United States likely would have weighed the lives of the Germans a bit differently than that of the Japanese.

Let me walk you through my logic on this.

1) If we accept that the bombings were purely political, and not of any military necessity; then we must evaluate the decision to drop the bombs within only that context.

2) To have killed hundreds of thousands of defeated Germans using nuclear weapons, would have not nearly as resonated as well within American or European civilization; due to the Japanese being viewed as subhuman, merciless animals.

c) Given these views, it's apparent how the Administration was more inclined to drop the bomb on the Japanese, even though the Japanese were already defeated. This same decision is less likely to be made against White Europeans in the heart of Europe.

I don't think that can be known. Had it been Germans defending those islands to virtually the last man and engaging in that kind of conduct, and had it been Hitler on the Home Islands promising to never surrender, I think we may well have made the same decision.

Again, I think this ignores the very real, yet less publicly known realities of the war.

While yes, the Japanese put forward a policy of "fighting to virtually the last man," America knew that the Japanese had made numerous overtures to the Soviet Union, the Vatican, and the OSS to mediate a surrender that would allow for the Emperor to avoid prosecution and subsequent execution.

Again, as early as January 10, 1945, the Americans knew the Japanese wanted to surrender, and when we issued the Potsdam Declaration, it is widely acknowledged that the President had literally no intention of the Japanese accepting the terms prior to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which ultimately, they never did.

This has been documented by numerous historians going back to 1946.

Lastly, I think the dichotomy you present here never actually existed.

As documented by Gar Alperovitz, historian Martin Sherwin points out Truman's decision-making process (and the absence of any real need to use the bomb):

"...not the lack of an alternative that might induce Japan's surrender that led to the use of atomic bombs. It was the undesirability of relying on the available alternatives given the nuclear option (emphasis his).

The nuclear option was preferred because it promised dividends— not just the possibility that it would end the war but the hope that it would eliminate the need to rely on one of the other alternatives."

"(the) choice in the summer of 1945 was not between a conventional invasion or a nuclear war. It was a choice between various forms of diplomacy and warfare."

"While the decision Truman made is understandable, it was not inevitable. It was even avoidable."

This kind of illustrates the point I was making above. You are describing accurately the horrible way in which the Japanese prosecuted that war -- it wasn't racist to point out what the Japanese were doing and condemn it, even if it was expressed in racist terms. And if that conduct fostered/amplified whatever latent racism already existed, it was still ultimately the way in which the Japanese decided to wage that war -- their actual conduct that you accurately described -- that primarily determined how they were viewed.

I've kind of veered away from the point of racism, but will only backtrack in order to point out the decision making process had far less to do with the military considerations of invasion, and instead, the use of this destructive weapon as a political tool.

I think once one accepts the argument that there was no military necessity to the bombing, then one has to entertain the quality that race introduced into the equation.

Moreover, the Los Alamos scientists largely felt race was indeed a component in dropping the bomb over Japan and largely opposed the idea.

With respect to the invasion of Normandy as evidence that we were really just trying to forestall the Soviets, I think it should be remembered that the message the USSR and Stalin were sending to the western Allies was "get off your asses and invade as soon as possible. So I think it may be a bit of after the fact Cold War projection obscuring what was still the primary concern in 1944 -- defeating the Germans. If the Soviets themselves were a lot more concerned about actually beating the Germans than us gaining a foothold on the continent, they sure didn't act like it.

I agree with you here with respect to the invasion of Europe. But by 1945, the Soviets were actually stalling the Japanese peace negotiations in the hopes of conquering territory in Southeast Asia and hopefully Japan itself.

So the calculus here is quite different, I think.

So while what the world would be like after the war was something that was certainly considered at some level, I don't think that affected Ike's decision-making on the invasion. And in fact, he was actually less aggressive in limiting the Soviet advance in 1945 than many others thought he should have been -- he didn't want to expend American lives just to keep a few more miles of ground away from the Soviets.

But with respect to the original question, Eisenhower was adamantly against the atomic bombing of Japan for exactly the reason you just described. It was not of military necessity and was, in his view, highly immoral.

But it also said that to the Japanese, so how do we know that was not the primary intent?.

We know the primary intent of the Japanese from late July was to surrender; and we knew prior to dropping the bomb on Nagasaki that Japan was making motions to do just that.

We also knew that the Japanese would have surrendered to the United States prior to any Soviet invasion from decoded communiques that we had been capturing for quite some time.

Would you agree that the cost in both U.S., Japanese, and other lives of an invasion -- or even of the war dragging on for longer in China, blockading of Japan, etc.. was a major factor considered when discussing whether or not to drop the bomb, even if you don't believe it was the most important factor?

A major factor? No. Definitely not.

MacArthur and Eisenhower both felt that Japan was defeated and the atomic bombings were unnecessary. Neither thought an actual invasion was necessary or warranted given that it was widely known that Japan wanted to discuss terms for surrender.

The OSS had advised the Administration that Japan had absolutely no intention of letting the war drag on, and desperately wanted to avoid any possibility that the USSR would invade the main islands of Japan - even if that meant surrendering to the Americans.

The OSS advised the Administration that in early May, Japan had made overtures to Portugal to surrender and removed any conditions save one. The only condition for surrender was the retention of the Emperor.

Given that the Potsdam Declaration was ambiguous enough so as to delay the ending of the war (to which both Churchill and Stalin opposed), it's fairly obvious the intention of the Truman Administration at this point.

So given this, and given the fact that the Emperor was ultimately retained. What does invasion actually accomplish?

So, to answer your question, I don't think invasion really was considered a likely scenario. There was no dichotomy of choices between dropping the atomic bombs and a land invasion; I think that's a popular belief, but it's not really based on historical evidence.

Because I don't think it is remotely credible to think that Roosevelt, Truman, Marshall, etc. were not concerned about the cost in U.S. lives (at least) of the war dragging on for longer.

Roosevelt was open to the idea of a public display of a test shot for the Japanese and Soviets to witness.

Marshall argued the decision to use the atomic bomb (i.e., the destruction of an entire city) was entirely political and he should not be asked one way or the other. He advised the weapons be used tactically against military targets. He also advised the Soviets be made aware of the weapon and be present during the Trinity shot; which was dismissed out of hand (again, intent here is important).

Truman on the other hand, had very different intentions. By 1945, Truman felt the primary enemy would soon change from the Axis to the Soviets; and he wanted to contain communism as much as he possibly could.

Another month of two of fire bombings would have cost the lives of a lot more American aircrews. More sailors would have died, more Allied troops would have died on the Asian mainland, etc.. Why should we endure that when we had the means to (hopefully) end the war with one more bombing raid?

A couple of problems with this argument.

1) This argument ignores the fact that on July 25, 1945, the United States strategic goals in Japan changed. Urban centers were not even tertiary-level targets of interest. Japanese infrastructure had already been decimated, famine was rampant, and most military targets had already been highly damaged.

2) The United States was not likely to continue heavily bombing Japan prior to the scheduled November invasion.

3) By this point of the war, Japan lacked significant capacity to defend it's airspace, so the risk to American aircrews was minimal.

4) It was not believed that the atomic bombs would actually change the real terms of surrender; and, they did not. The terms had not changed since May.

5) The United States knew that Japan would surrender only if the Soviets were poised to invade, or, if the United States assured the safety of the Emperor.

6) The Japanese proposed the ultimately agreed upon terms, and had the United States accepted, the war would have ended in 4-5 months earlier than it did.

7) Henry Stimson, Secretary of War at the time, recognized that the United States' policy of "unconditional surrender" ultimately and unnecessarily cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people while achieving nothing either militarily or politically.

8) The Soviet invasion of Manchuria, and the subsequent invasion of Southeast Asia (which ultimately would lead to the Korean War) would almost assuredly never have happened had the United States not prolonged the war solely to use the atomic bomb.

9) This argument ignores the likelihood that the Potsdam Declaration was deliberately worded so as to prolong the war.

Lastly, I'll quote the US Strategic Bombing Survey (July 1946)

"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

So, to answer your question again; no, I don't think the dichotomy of choice existed between invasion and the dropping of the atomic bomb. I think that's an oversimplification and even romanticized view of the realities that were involved and the positions of the parties advising the President.

I'd also point out the cost to the Japanese. As everyone knows, more Japanese died in the Tokyo firebombing raids than in either of the nuke blasts.

This is often cited as a reason to justify the attacks; just want to point out a couple of things.

Tokyo is an ancient and massive city. It's size is really hard to appreciate; but, during the height of the war going back to 1944, the population of Tokyo was 6.8M. This was a city that was built primarily out of wood. In fact, much of the older parts of the city were considered extremely flammable.

This was known to the United States prior to the firebombing of Tokyo; and this was a concerted strategy - the de-urbanization of the population there.

These firebombing raids which killed upwards of 200,000 people; as horrible as they were, are not really directly comparable to the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Those bombings decimated those cities completely, killing, maiming or displacing more than half of each of their populations. A subsequent September nuclear attack on Tokyo would have killed an estimated 1.1 million people outright.

So, in short, I think people misunderstand the scale, population density, and size of Tokyo compared to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Had those weapons been used in large population centers, the extent of death would have eclipsed the previous bombings.

A couple more months of fire bombings likely would have cost a lot more lives than what the nukes took. And, there was the issue of the continued blockade, and the suffering of the Japanese people.

1) The firebombings of Tokyo weren't easily repeatable for the aforementioned reasons.

2) It is odd to argue the blockade was less humane that the nuclear attacks; don't you think?

Just as a final thing about Hirohito. Part of the circumstances that led to WW@ in the first place was the German belief/mythology that they had not really been defeated in WWI, but rather "stabbed in the back" by traitors at home. That memory was undoubtedly stronger in 1945 than it is today, and the people making decisions at the time did not want a repeat of that myth to sow the seeds for another war in either theater, which is why we demanded unconditional surrender in both theaters. Truman was a WWI combat veteran himself, so the idea of "we have to fight them again because we didn't end it right the first time" was likely part of his thinking.

I understand what you mean, but, I don't think there is any evidence of this conjecture being true given the United States clearly planned to occupy and retain Japan.

Having Hirohito himself publicly acknowledge defeat was part of ensuring that the fact of defeat would be acknowledge throughout all elements of Japanese society.

But that was not the purpose of the announcement. The public announcement was made so that (1) Hirohito could end the war without any fear of a coup d'etat overturning that decision, possibly imprisoning him (2) because only the Emperor could get the people to understand that the war must end, and it was not a matter of interpretation.

It wasn't the decision of the Allies to have the Emperor speak, it was his own, and that of his advisers.

That was also likely a major concern given that we knew we were about to embark on an extended occupation, and would not want to be dealing with a guerilla resistance by dead-enders who refused to concede defeat.

Again, I really don't think this conjecture is evidenced by the facts that we know of.

Getting back to the original question, within the context of these facts, the bombings certainly seem political, IMHO. While one could attempt to make an argument of necessity, I don't think that's really the strongest argument here, from an historical standpoint; so leaving biases aside, I'm not sure why we would accept that conclusion over the more obvious one.

 

[gourimoko]

Okay, so I really see both sides of the issue:

First, as @The Human Q-Tip noted, we can't look at information that was unknown or unforeseeable at the time. So, for example, I've seen arguments that the usage of the nuclear bomb at the end of WWII resulted in U.S. enemies fracturing. And this, in turn, has led to terrorism. Regardless of the validity of that argument, there was no way to predict that would happen, so it should not be considered in the debate.

Agreed.

The best record for this info, in my opinion, occurs in the U.S. FRUS documents, where the detail discussions in the USFG. The argument Truman and his advisors made was that, in using the nuclear bombs, we'll end the war and ultimately save lives. Discounting the necessity of using two bombs - which, I believe, was to send a message to the Soviets that we had more than one bomb - I do understand where the USFG was coming from. A lot of intelligence from military commanders suggested the Japanese would still be fighting unless we utterly crushed them, consequently, I really do empathize with Truman's decision.

I'm not sure I agree that the opinion of the military commanders suggests a widespread belief that invasion was necessary. I think it was widely accepted and well understood that Japan had been defeated by mid-1945, and that any use of atomic weapons was largely a political decision.

With that said, from a moral level, I'm always concerned with creating mass destruction. The question becomes, could the United States have ended the war without a nuclear weapon being dropped? And moreover, what would the costs have been had they not used the weapon? The issue is, immediate human life destruction is not the only impact.

I haven't really addressed the moral question; because I've tried to avoid both the ethical and political calculation here.

I don't think one can make an ethical argument to support the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Arguably the first, but I see no rationale behind the second; surrender was imminent.

However, politically, that's where I'd start to diverge from what may appear to be my position and more towards that of Truman's.

The usage of the nuclear weapon threw significant fuel in the Cold War's fire, making it escalate much quicker, and resulting in many small wars right after WWII. This was a foreseeable impact, especially after Truman's meeting with Stalin, and for me that was costly.

Agreed, and a cost that simply cannot be overlooked.

Ultimately, I don't really know where I stand. I can see both sides and I think both have fair arguments. I'm looking forward to reading the rest of this discussion.

Indeed.

I think the question really has to be kept as narrow and discrete as possible to really be answered though.

For me, the original question as to whether or not the bombings were political or military necessity, I think, is fairly straight forward. I don't find compelling evidence to suggest that the Allies needed to use nuclear weapons to end the war, given what we know.

However, if the question is reformulated, then I think I might be more open to the use of nuclear weapons; particularly, against the Soviets once they demonstrated not only the intent but the capability of developing nuclear weapons to threaten the United States.

If the argument is that, we will need to occupy Japan before the Soviets get there, and one appreciates the ramifications of that action; then one has to ask, why stop at Berlin and Tokyo?

 

[Sebastian]

How about the Crusades?


A Stannis-brokered truce should be respected by all parties....

The truce you speak of is one I insist on in this thread. I am well aware people have differences and a bad history, but, I need disparate intellects to share with each other. There is so much to gain from opposing points of view.

The Crusades will be an interesting debate, I think. Thanks to folks like John Esposito, most have a bizarre impression that Crusades were the first interaction between Islam and Europe...

Timely too. Last month I finally got my Eastman Press copies of Runciman's seminal "A History of the Crusades." Wonderful, leather-bound volumes.

Well, I'll first respond to your question with one of my own: when you say:

I too have had a change of heart on the issue over the years as more information has become available....

Are you referring to information that was known to the U.S. government at the time it made the decision, or to information regarding internal deliberations within Japan? Because I think the merits of our decision can only be judged fairly by what we actually knew at the time.

I do want to thank you for bringing this point up. It is a keen historical insight insofar as it is how history is evaluated at a scholarly level. It is my hope that the standard for this thread is high and the evaluation of history based on the knowledge/morals/culture of the time in question is prominent in people's arguments.

Can't wait to talk about Napoleon. I have about 100 books in my Napoleonic Library. PM me if you want to see some serious book porn. "Many leather bound books, my condo smells of rich mahogany."

 

[Sebastian]

A couple of counter points to add to @BimboColesHair 's point.



Well, we did have quite a few projections with respect to progress in the war, particularly in late 1944, early 1945. It was the majority opinion of the American military command that Japan would surrender (without invasion), no later than November 1945.

When consulted, General Eisenhower had strongly advised against the use of nuclear weapons on the basis that it was completely unnecessary; the Japanese were going to surrender without a land invasion - "they had already been defeated."

Again, I don't think we can simultaneously acknowledge the fact that the Japanese were motioning for surrender, repeatedly since January, and that the American government was aware of this; while then considering the complexities/difficulties of invading the main islands of Japan.

What exactly would we be invading for? To depose the Emperor, and that's it?

So this brings us back to the more likely, and more historically accurate (imho) opinion, that the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Japan for the aforementioned reasons by myself and @BimboColesHair .



I think it did. For the reasons @King Stannis pointed out; the United States likely would have weighed the lives of the Germans a bit differently than that of the Japanese.

Let me walk you through my logic on this.

1) If we accept that the bombings were purely political, and not of any military necessity; then we must evaluate the decision to drop the bombs within only that context.

2) To have killed hundreds of thousands of defeated Germans using nuclear weapons, would have not nearly as resonated as well within American or European civilization; due to the Japanese being viewed as subhuman, merciless animals.

c) Given these views, it's apparent how the Administration was more inclined to drop the bomb on the Japanese, even though the Japanese were already defeated. This same decision is less likely to be made against White Europeans in the heart of Europe.



Again, I think this ignores the very real, yet less publicly known realities of the war.

While yes, the Japanese put forward a policy of "fighting to virtually the last man," America knew that the Japanese had made numerous overtures to the Soviet Union, the Vatican, and the OSS to mediate a surrender that would allow for the Emperor to avoid prosecution and subsequent execution.

Again, as early as January 10, 1945, the Americans knew the Japanese wanted to surrender, and when we issued the Potsdam Declaration, it is widely acknowledged that the President had literally no intention of the Japanese accepting the terms prior to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which ultimately, they never did.

This has been documented by numerous historians going back to 1946.

Lastly, I think the dichotomy you present here never actually existed.

As documented by Gar Alperovitz, historian Martin Sherwin points out Truman's decision-making process (and the absence of any real need to use the bomb):

"...not the lack of an alternative that might induce Japan's surrender that led to the use of atomic bombs. It was the undesirability of relying on the available alternatives given the nuclear option (emphasis his).

The nuclear option was preferred because it promised dividends— not just the possibility that it would end the war but the hope that it would eliminate the need to rely on one of the other alternatives."

"(the) choice in the summer of 1945 was not between a conventional invasion or a nuclear war. It was a choice between various forms of diplomacy and warfare."

"While the decision Truman made is understandable, it was not inevitable. It was even avoidable."



I've kind of veered away from the point of racism, but will only backtrack in order to point out the decision making process had far less to do with the military considerations of invasion, and instead, the use of this destructive weapon as a political tool.

I think once one accepts the argument that there was no military necessity to the bombing, then one has to entertain the quality that race introduced into the equation.

Moreover, the Los Alamos scientists largely felt race was indeed a component in dropping the bomb over Japan and largely opposed the idea.



I agree with you here with respect to the invasion of Europe. But by 1945, the Soviets were actually stalling the Japanese peace negotiations in the hopes of conquering territory in Southeast Asia and hopefully Japan itself.

So the calculus here is quite different, I think.



But with respect to the original question, Eisenhower was adamantly against the atomic bombing of Japan for exactly the reason you just described. It was not of military necessity and was, in his view, highly immoral.



We know the primary intent of the Japanese from late July was to surrender; and we knew prior to dropping the bomb on Nagasaki that Japan was making motions to do just that.

We also knew that the Japanese would have surrendered to the United States prior to any Soviet invasion from decoded communiques that we had been capturing for quite some time.



A major factor? No. Definitely not.

MacArthur and Eisenhower both felt that Japan was defeated and the atomic bombings were unnecessary. Neither thought an actual invasion was necessary or warranted given that it was widely known that Japan wanted to discuss terms for surrender.

The OSS had advised the Administration that Japan had absolutely no intention of letting the war drag on, and desperately wanted to avoid any possibility that the USSR would invade the main islands of Japan - even if that meant surrendering to the Americans.

The OSS advised the Administration that in early May, Japan had made overtures to Portugal to surrender and removed any conditions save one. The only condition for surrender was the retention of the Emperor.

Given that the Potsdam Declaration was ambiguous enough so as to delay the ending of the war (to which both Churchill and Stalin opposed), it's fairly obvious the intention of the Truman Administration at this point.

So given this, and given the fact that the Emperor was ultimately retained. What does invasion actually accomplish?

So, to answer your question, I don't think invasion really was considered a likely scenario. There was no dichotomy of choices between dropping the atomic bombs and a land invasion; I think that's a popular belief, but it's not really based on historical evidence.



Roosevelt was open to the idea of a public display of a test shot for the Japanese and Soviets to witness.

Marshall argued the decision to use the atomic bomb (i.e., the destruction of an entire city) was entirely political and he should not be asked one way or the other. He advised the weapons be used tactically against military targets. He also advised the Soviets be made aware of the weapon and be present during the Trinity shot; which was dismissed out of hand (again, intent here is important).

Truman on the other hand, had very different intentions. By 1945, Truman felt the primary enemy would soon change from the Axis to the Soviets; and he wanted to contain communism as much as he possibly could.



A couple of problems with this argument.

1) This argument ignores the fact that on July 25, 1945, the United States strategic goals in Japan changed. Urban centers were not even tertiary-level targets of interest. Japanese infrastructure had already been decimated, famine was rampant, and most military targets had already been highly damaged.

2) The United States was not likely to continue heavily bombing Japan prior to the scheduled November invasion.

3) By this point of the war, Japan lacked significant capacity to defend it's airspace, so the risk to American aircrews was minimal.

4) It was not believed that the atomic bombs would actually change the real terms of surrender; and, they did not. The terms had not changed since May.

5) The United States knew that Japan would surrender only if the Soviets were poised to invade, or, if the United States assured the safety of the Emperor.

6) The Japanese proposed the ultimately agreed upon terms, and had the United States accepted, the war would have ended in 4-5 months earlier than it did.

7) Henry Stimson, Secretary of War at the time, recognized that the United States' policy of "unconditional surrender" ultimately and unnecessarily cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people while achieving nothing either militarily or politically.

8) The Soviet invasion of Manchuria, and the subsequent invasion of Southeast Asia (which ultimately would lead to the Korean War) would almost assuredly never have happened had the United States not prolonged the war solely to use the atomic bomb.

9) This argument ignores the likelihood that the Potsdam Declaration was deliberately worded so as to prolong the war.

Lastly, I'll quote the US Strategic Bombing Survey (July 1946)

"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

So, to answer your question again; no, I don't think the dichotomy of choice existed between invasion and the dropping of the atomic bomb. I think that's an oversimplification and even romanticized view of the realities that were involved and the positions of the parties advising the President.



This is often cited as a reason to justify the attacks; just want to point out a couple of things.

Tokyo is an ancient and massive city. It's size is really hard to appreciate; but, during the height of the war going back to 1944, the population of Tokyo was 6.8M. This was a city that was built primarily out of wood. In fact, much of the older parts of the city were considered extremely flammable.

This was known to the United States prior to the firebombing of Tokyo; and this was a concerted strategy - the de-urbanization of the population there.

These firebombing raids which killed upwards of 200,000 people; as horrible as they were, are not really directly comparable to the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Those bombings decimated those cities completely, killing, maiming or displacing more than half of each of their populations. A subsequent September nuclear attack on Tokyo would have killed an estimated 1.1 million people outright.

So, in short, I think people misunderstand the scale, population density, and size of Tokyo compared to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Had those weapons been used in large population centers, the extent of death would have eclipsed the previous bombings.



1) The firebombings of Tokyo weren't easily repeatable for the aforementioned reasons.

2) It is odd to argue the blockade was less humane that the nuclear attacks; don't you think?



I understand what you mean, but, I don't think there is any evidence of this conjecture being true given the United States clearly planned to occupy and retain Japan.



But that was not the purpose of the announcement. The public announcement was made so that (1) Hirohito could end the war without any fear of a coup d'etat overturning that decision, possibly imprisoning him (2) because only the Emperor could get the people to understand that the war must end, and it was not a matter of interpretation.

It wasn't the decision of the Allies to have the Emperor speak, it was his own, and that of his advisers.



Again, I really don't think this conjecture is evidenced by the facts that we know of.

Getting back to the original question, within the context of these facts, the bombings certainly seem political, IMHO. While one could attempt to make an argument of necessity, I don't think that's really the strongest argument here, from an historical standpoint; so leaving biases aside, I'm not sure why we would accept that conclusion over the more obvious one.

Impressive. I will admit the PTO is not one of my areas of expertise, but merely an area of competence.

Certainly @The Human Q-Tip is welcome to rebut, but would I be mistaken in thinking the Crusades should be our next stop in our journey? I think @jking948 is going to be the MVP of that topic.

If we're going to talk general history, can we please just discuss how Rasputin died?

Still vividly remember most of the story. Damn you Mr. Minor for saying that I'd never forget this story. You were fucking right.

Yes! And, evidently, the man had a YUUUGE cock. @The Oi. No wonder the ladies liked him.

 

[brownindian]

Yes! And, evidently, the man had a YUUUGE cock. @The Oi. No wonder the ladies liked him.

And that my King is the "Hard" truth !

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Timely too. Last month I finally got my Eastman Press copies of Runciman's seminal "A History of the Crusades." Wonderful, leather-bound volumes.

I'm honestly jealous. Lovely books.

I do want to thank you for bringing this point up. It is a keen historical insight insofar as it is how history is evaluated at a scholarly level. It is my hope that the standard for this thread is high and the evaluation of history based on the knowledge/morals/culture of the time in question is prominent in people's arguments.

One other historiographical concept that I've always thought particularly relevant is how the passage of time can lead us to falsely define contemporary scholarship. For example, there's a tendency to look at Polybius or Plutarch as being "original sources" because they were ancient writers. But Plutarch wasn't born until after Christ, so his "Lives" written about people like Alexander or Pyrrhus were actually written about people dead and buried for hundreds of years. It would be like considering a modern writer to be an original, contemporaneous source for George Washington.

And I think that is even true for much shorter periods of time. Just because someone was writing about someone who lived in their time doesn't mean their information was accurate, or based on anything other than second-hand sources/hearsay. That's why I think everything has to be run through the "does this pass the common-sense test" standard, at a minimum.

There's a tremendous article/book about Ty Cobb by Charles Leehrsen that, though not perfect, points out that a lot of the popular mythology about Cobb is based on lies. Bogus stories told, passed on, and accepted as true by supposed (or at least self-professed) scholars.

So my point is that it makes a lot of sense to apply some serious skepticism to historical sources. Probably explains why I think Procopius likely made up a whole bunch of the shit he wrote in the Secret History.

Can't wait to talk about Napoleon. I have about 100 books in my Napoleonic Library. PM me if you want to see some serious book porn. "Many leather bound books, my condo smells of rich mahogany."

You've got me there. I've read a lot about him and his Marshalls, but 100 book collection is damn impressive.

 

[The Human Q-Tip]

Well, we did have quite a few projections with respect to progress in the war, particularly in late 1944, early 1945. It was the majority opinion of the American military command that Japan would surrender (without invasion), no later than November 1945.

When consulted, General Eisenhower had strongly advised against the use of nuclear weapons on the basis that it was completely unnecessary; the Japanese were going to surrender without a land invasion - "they had already been defeated."

Again, I don't think we can simultaneously acknowledge the fact that the Japanese were motioning for surrender, repeatedly since January, and that the American government was aware of this; while then considering the complexities/difficulties of invading the main islands of Japan.

Okay, rather than getting stuck in the weeds -- which means increasingly deeper forays into details that have consumed thousands of pages of scholarship that cannot be replicated here -- I'm going to step back and look at the forest for a bit. And I want to say at the outset that I don't mean to mischaracterize anything anyone said, so if anyone thinks I have done so, it was not intentional - I am simply trying to condense arguments into manageable chunks. That's inevitably going to involve some paraphrasing, etc...

First, there clearly were differences of opinion within both our government and the Japanese government (and our respective militaries), regarding a whole host of issues, including the likelihood of an actual, effective Japanese surrender regarding the terms being discussed/leaked, the relative desireability or importance of particular terms, how long Japan would be able to continue resisting, and the morality of using those bombs at all. So I don't think citing particular opinions of particular people is very helpful because there are counters on each side.

And I don't think second-guessing the information on which the Presidents chose to rely makes much sense because we inevitably run into dueling historians/critics. As one example only, Ike had zero experience with the Pacific War, and his opinion rationally could be discounted, or even ignored completely, in favor of any senior Pacific commander.

But on to the big issue as I see it -- American motives. The basic theory advanced by some, including @BimboColesHair and @gourimoko, is that the bombs were dropped to gain some kind of geopolitical advantage over the Soviets, not because of military/political considerations relating specifically to Japan. And in that regard, gouri made this statement upthread:

1) Allied forces, including both Roosevelt Administration as informed by General MacArthur, and the Soviets informed directly by the Japanese delegation, knew unequivocally that the Japanese government (including the military) were amicable to the exact same terms that were ultimately accepted after the bombings. This was known no later than early January 1945.

@BimboColesHair said something related:

I think part of it was done to end the war ASAP with the U.S. as the strongest military and economic power in an ever shrinking world, and having as much of the world under the Western umbrella as possible.

I think what sometimes happens when this particular issue gets discussed is that we look at it in isolation, and fail to take into account everything else that was going on. So going by gourimoko's "early January 1945" timeframe (and I'm not agreeing with it -- just going with it for the sake of argument), let's look at what was going on in the war:

1) The western Allies were still attempting to retake ground that had been lost to the Germans in the Ardennes -- the Battle of the Bulge was still going on. We did not yet have a Rhine crossing, and didn't get one until the first week of March 1945.

2) The U.S. was suffering significant shortages of trained infantrymen, and because of the need to keep factories running, plus staff the huge logistical tail we needed to fight a war on a different continent (add in Navy and Army Air Corps) actually had a manpower shortage overall.

3) Britain was still suffering heavily from wartime privations, and was also short men.

4) We had not yet successfully taken a single Japanese Home Island -- Iwo Jima and Okinawa didn't happened until later.

In light of these factors, the ability to transfer most of the forces being used in the Pacific campaign to Europe as of "early January 1945" would have been an absolute godsend. Transferring the bombers, ships, and a good number of troops to the European theater would have been a huge boost. Logistical support also could have focused much more heavily on keeping the troops in Europe supplied.

More importantly, what better way to limit the Soviets than to get more forces as quickly as possible to Europe so as to increase the amount of territory the Western Allies could seize? Why not obtain an orderly surrender of Japan in early January 1945 while the Soviets were still heavily engaged in the West and would not be in a position to seize Manchuria? To my mind, the earlier we could get an acceptable Japanese surrender, the better for the long-term goal of limiting the Soviets. Shit, we didn't even know in January 1945 that the bombs would actually work.

I also have to say that I don't find it credible to believe that FDR would have deliberately wasted the lives of so many additional troops in the Pacific theater if he could have obtained a surrender on acceptable grounds much earlier. He was dying, and knew it. I can't believe he didn't want to see a victory in the Pacific before he died, if he believed a victory could be obtained on acceptable terms.

So this goes back to the motive issue. I don't see prolonging the Pacific War as being in the U.S. interest vis-à-vis the Soviets. So if FDR and/or Truman truly believed that acceptable terms were available and would be honored by the Japanese, they would have accepted them when offered. Which leads to the conclusion that either 1) the terms on which the Japanese wished to surrender were not acceptable to the Presidents on their own merits at the time they were made or 2) we did not believe that the Japanese would fully honor/comply with the terms being leaked/proposed.

]"While the decision Truman made is understandable, it was not inevitable. It was even avoidable."

However, I do agree with that statement. It was clearly "avoidable". But I also believe it was understandable and justifiable as well. Just as you could have justified a decision not to have dropped the bombs.

Just on a purely human level, the cost and brutality of that war is something that I think must have impacted the people involved greatly, particularly the two Presidents. They knew the cost to the people fighting the war, the people at home, and really, to the entire rest of the world. I think they wanted the war to be over as quickly as possible, and not be involved in protracted negotiations while the war dragged on. But they also wanted to make sure that the end was really "the end", which is why they insisted on such harsh terms.

I don't mind the second guessing of the decision, because I could see the justification if they'd decided to just wait out "unconditional surrender." What I don't agree with is the casting of aspersions on the motives, because the price in blood that already had been paid was something that gave us the moral right to determine the peace that was acceptable.

 

[Jordan]

I, for one, am glad @gourimoko and @The Human Q-Tip are engaging in discussions again. I know you guys don't agree on politics but historical debates could be really fun between the two of you. I'm digging this thread so far.

 

[Bill Walton.]

The only thing I know about history, is that history never repeats itself!