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Meade would agree. Two things are undeniable in battle: 1) Good ground, 2) Panic leads to defeat.
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The Military Thread
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Meade would agree. Two things are undeniable in battle: 1) Good ground, 2) Panic leads to defeat.
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The problem is that Trump does not, and cannot, think for himself. He doesn't have any real policy positions because he doesn't know enough about anything to have an informed opinion (this could be said to some minor extant with W. and Obama due to inexperience rather than the sheer intellectual void that is Trump).
As a consequence, he is essentially pushed in one direction or another by the two factions fighting to control the cipher; Bannon and Kushner/Priebus.
I will bet you a shiny nickel that one of Steve Bannon's people had the Article V language removed after Mattis, McMaster and Tillerson fought for days to have it included. Bannon is a deluded Breitbart nut job isolationist paranoid about Jewish, er, I mean Globalist conspiracies and one can detect his handiwork on this issue and the withdrawal from the Paris Accords.
Do you disagree, @The Human Q-Tip?
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@The Human Q-Tip, @Marcus
I finished up Leggiere's biography on Field Marshal Blücher. I hadn't noticed until now but Leggiere also wrote the books I have on the Leipzig Campaign and Napoleon's infatuation with Berlin. He takes a very Pro-Prussian view. Have you read his books, 'Tip? I know you've studied many of Napoleon's later campaigns.
Despite Leggiere's very friendly tone on Blücher, I found that old Marshal Vorwart was actually an extremely unstable and reckless commander and was at his best when restrained. From the period of his defeat and capture at the hands of Marshall Bernadotte at Lübeck in 1806, to the time Napoleon's Grand Armee was defeated in Russia in 1812, he continually tried to goad his master, King Frederick William III, into a disastrous war with France when Prussia had army of only 42,000 and no allies. He repeatedly threatened to invade French occupied areas to trigger a war and often blackmailed the King with threats of resignation. Needless to say, such actions would have doomed Prussia and belies terrible judgement beyond the tactical level. That Leggiere continually praises Blücher, and the Prussian strategy during the Leipzig Campaign, while attacking the record of Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte, smacks of Prussian homerism.
Given Napoleon's preferred strategy of the Battle of the Central Position, and the geography of the theater of operations, I believe aggressive advances advocated by Blücher with his Army of Silesia, and Von Bülow with the Army of the North under Bernadotte, would have played right into Napoleon's hands. The closer each of the two separate armies came to Napoleon, the easier it would have been for him to attack one army, than the other, by rapid shifting of his outnumbered forces. Because Bernadotte and Allied Command refused to accede to Prussia's demands, and kept the three Allied armies well-distanced from one another, Napoleon was unable to attack each Army in rapid succession due to geographic distance, and, more importantly, was unable to come to the aid of Marshals Oudinot and Ney, whom he tasked with attacking Berlin and were defeated by Bernadotte, and Vandamme who was routed at Kulm. Those defeats robbed Napoleon of the fruits of his brilliant victories at Leutzen, Bautzen and Dresden and led to the disaster of Leipzig.
General von Bülow's (center of the Infantry Square) Prussian Corps held Marshal Ney's Army of Berlin long enough to crumble the French lines. The arrival of Crown Prince Karl Johan's (mounted, center) Swedish Corps completed the rout.
The question is whether Blücher's strategic shortcomings were compensated by his tactical prowess. Would Waterloo have happened if the Prussians were knocked out of the war due to the destruction of the Army of Silesia in 1813?
I finished up Leggiere's biography on Field Marshal Blücher. I hadn't noticed until now but Leggiere also wrote the books I have on the Leipzig Campaign and Napoleon's infatuation with Berlin. He takes a very Pro-Prussian view. Have you read his books, 'Tip? I know you've studied many of Napoleon's later campaigns.
Despite Leggiere's very friendly tone on Blücher, I found that old Marshal Vorwart was actually an extremely unstable and reckless commander and was at his best when restrained. From the period of his defeat and capture at the hands of Marshall Bernadotte at Lübeck in 1806, to the time Napoleon's Grand Armee was defeated in Russia in 1812, he continually tried to goad his master, King Frederick William III, into a disastrous war with France when Prussia had army of only 42,000 and no allies. He repeatedly threatened to invade French occupied areas to trigger a war and often blackmailed the King with threats of resignation. Needless to say, such actions would have doomed Prussia and belies terrible judgement beyond the tactical level. That Leggiere continually praises Blücher, and the Prussian strategy during the Leipzig Campaign, while attacking the record of Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte, smacks of Prussian homerism.
Given Napoleon's preferred strategy of the Battle of the Central Position, and the geography of the theater of operations, I believe aggressive advances advocated by Blücher with his Army of Silesia, and Von Bülow with the Army of the North under Bernadotte, would have played right into Napoleon's hands. The closer each of the two separate armies came to Napoleon, the easier it would have been for him to attack one army, than the other, by rapid shifting of his outnumbered forces. Because Bernadotte and Allied Command refused to accede to Prussia's demands, and kept the three Allied armies well-distanced from one another, Napoleon was unable to attack each Army in rapid succession due to geographic distance, and, more importantly, was unable to come to the aid of Marshals Oudinot and Ney, whom he tasked with attacking Berlin and were defeated by Bernadotte, and Vandamme who was routed at Kulm. Those defeats robbed Napoleon of the fruits of his brilliant victories at Leutzen, Bautzen and Dresden and led to the disaster of Leipzig.
General von Bülow's (center of the Infantry Square) Prussian Corps held Marshal Ney's Army of Berlin long enough to crumble the French lines. The arrival of Crown Prince Karl Johan's (mounted, center) Swedish Corps completed the rout.
The question is whether Blücher's strategic shortcomings were compensated by his tactical prowess. Would Waterloo have happened if the Prussians were knocked out of the war due to the destruction of the Army of Silesia in 1813?
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Military Leader of the Day
Field Marshal Gebhard von Blücher
If Archduke Charles was a model of quiet competence tempered with restraint and caution, Blücher, also known as Marshal Vorwarts! (Forward!) was his opposite. Blücher was a hard charging cavalry officer who lived life as he waged war: Fast, furious and to excess. His wild disposition, which led to his dismissal from the Prussian Army by Frederick the Great himself, was later tempered with humility and by the time the Wars of the French Revolution had broken out he was a celebrated officer worshipped by his men. Blücher always favored the attack and his impetuosity was both his greatest strength and his greatest weakness. Stubbornness was the other great strength. After being hunted down by half the French Army following the Prussian cataclysm at Jena-Auerstedt, a surrounded Blücher only surrendered after having his positions stormed by the French and his escape cut-off. Blücher surrendered to Marshal Bernadotte and added to the surrender document "I only surrender because I have no bullets or bread."
Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, Fürst von Wahlstatt (German pronunciation: [ˈɡɛphaɐ̯t ˈleːbəʁɛçt fɔn ˈblʏçɐ]; 16 December 1742 – 12 September 1819), Graf (count), later elevated to Fürst (sovereign prince) von Wahlstatt, was a Prussian Generalfeldmarschall (field marshal). He earned his greatest recognition after leading his army against Napoleon I at the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig in 1813 and the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.
His military career began in 1758 as a hussar in the Swedish Army. He was captured by the Prussians in 1760 during the Pomeranian Campaign and thereafter joined the Prussian Army, serving as a hussar officer for Prussia during the remainder of the Seven Years' War. In 1773, Blücher was forced to resign by Frederick the Great for insubordination.
War broke out between Prussia and France again in 1813 and Blücher returned to active service at the age of 71. He was appointed full general over the Prussian field forces and clashed with Napoleon at the Battles of Lützen and Bautzen. Later he won a critical victory over the French at the Battle of Katzbach. Blücher commanded the Prussian Army of Silesia at the Battle of the Nations where Napoleon was decisively defeated. At the Battle of Ligny, he was severely injured and the Prussians retreated. After recovering, Blücher resumed command and joined Wellington at the Battle of Waterloo, with the intervention of Blücher's army playing a decisive role in the final allied victory.
Along with Paul von Hindenburg, he was the highest-decorated Prussian-German soldier in history: Blücher and Hindenburg are the only German military officers to have been awarded the Star of the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross.
Early life
Blücher was born on 16 December 1742 in Rostock a Baltic port in northern Germany then in the Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin,.[2] His father was a retired army captain, and his family had been landowners in northern Germany since at least the 13th century.[3]
He began his military career at the age of sixteen,[a] when he joined the Swedish Army as a hussar.[4] At the time, Sweden was at war with Prussia in the Seven Years' War. Blücher took part in the Pomeranian campaign of 1760, where Prussian Hussars captured him in a skirmish. The colonel of the Prussian regiment, Wilhelm Sebastian von Belling (a distant relative), was impressed with the young hussar and had him join his own regiment.[2][5]
Blücher took part in the later battles of the Seven Years' War, and as a hussar officer gained much experience in light cavalry work. In peace, however, his ardent spirit led him into excesses of all kinds, such as the mock execution of a priest suspected of supporting Polish uprisings in 1772. As a result, he was passed over for promotion to Major. Blücher submitted a rude letter of resignation in 1773, which Frederick the Great replied to with "Captain Blücher can take himself to the devil" (1773).[2]
Blücher settled down to farming. During Frederick the Great's life time, Blücher could not return to the army. However, the monarch died in 1786, and the following year Blücher was reinstated as a major in his old regiment, the Red Hussars. In 1793 and 1794, Blücher distinguished himself in cavalry actions against the French, and for his victory at Kirrweiler on 28 May 1794 he was promoted to major general. In 1801, he was made a lieutenant general.[2]
Napoleonic Wars
Marschall Vorwärts by Emil Hünten (1863).
At the double Battle of Jena-Auerstedt, Blücher fought at Auerstedt, repeatedly leading the charges of the Prussian cavalry, but without success. He led the remnant of his corps away to the north-west.[2] Reinforcing his numbers with a division previously commanded by Karl August, Grand Duke of Sax-Weimar, Blücher and his new chief of staff, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, reorganised his forces into two small corps totaling 21,000 men and 44 cannons.[7] Nevertheless, he was defeated by two French corps at the Battle of Lübeck [2] on 6 November. Blücher insisted that clauses be written in the capitulation document that he had had to surrender due to lack of provisions and ammunition,[2] and that his soldiers should be honoured by a French formation along the street. He was allowed to keep his sabre and to move freely, bound only by his word of honor.
Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher in Bautzen by Bogdan Willewalde (1885).
Following the start of the War of Liberation in the Spring of 1813, Blücher was again placed in high command, and he was present at Lützen and Bautzen. During the Summer truce, he worked on the organisation of the Prussian forces; when the war was resumed, he became commander-in-chief of the Army of Silesia, with August von Gneisenau and Karl von Müffling as his principal staff officers and 40,000 Prussians and 50,000 Russians under his command during the Autumn Campaign the most conspicuous military quality displayed by Blücher was his unrelenting energy.[2]
The irresolution and divergence of interests usual in Sixth Coalition armies found in him a restless opponent. He defeated Marshal MacDonald at the Katzbach, and by his victory over Marshal Marmont at Möckern led the way to the decisive defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig. Blücher's own army stormed Leipzig on the evening of the last day of the battle.[2] This was the fourth battle between Napoleon and Blücher, and the first that Blücher had won.[citation needed]
Old Blucher beating the Corsican Big Drum, George Cruikshank, 8 April 1814.
The Battle of Brienne and the Battle of La Rothière were the chief incidents of the first stage of the celebrated 1814 campaign in north-east France, and they were quickly followed by victories of Napoleon over Blücher at Champaubert, Vauchamps, and Montmirail.
Blücher infused some of his energy into the operations of the Prince Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia, and at last this army and the Army of Silesia marched in one body directly towards Paris. The victory of Montmartre, the entry of the allies into the French capital, and the overthrow of the First Empire were the direct consequences.[2]
Blücher was inclined to punish the city of Paris severely for the sufferings of Prussia at the hands of the French armies, but the allied commanders intervened. Blowing up the Jena Bridge near the Champ de Mars[2] was said by the Duke of Wellington to have been one of his contemplated acts.
In gratitude for his victories in 1814, King Frederick William III of Prussia created Blücher Prince of Wahlstatt (in Silesia on the Katzbach battlefield).[2]
Hundred Days and later life
The Prussian attack on Plancenoit during the Battle of Waterloo, painted by Adolph Northen
After the war Blücher retired to Silesia. However, the return of Napoleon from Elba he was put in command of the Army of the Lower Rhine, with General August von Gneisenau as his chief of staff. At the outset of the Waterloo Campaign of 1815 the Prussians sustained a serious defeat at Ligny (16 June), in the course of which the old field marshal lay trapped under his dead horse for several hours and was repeatedly ridden over by cavalry, his life only saved by the devotion of his aide-de-camp Count Nostitz, who threw a greatcoat over his commander, in order to obscure Blücher's rank and identity from the passing French. As Blücher was unable to resume command for some hours Gneisenau took command, drew off the defeated army and rallied it.[2] In spite of Gneisenau's distrust of Wellington, he obeyed Blücher's last orders to direct the army's retreat towards Wavre, rather than Liege, in order to keep alive the possibility of joining the Prussian and Wellington's Anglo-allied armies together.[13]
Blücher led his army on a tortuous march along muddy paths, arriving on the field of Waterloo in the late afternoon. In spite of his age, the pain of his wounds, and the effort it must have taken for him to remain on horseback, Bernard Cornwell states that several soldiers attested to Blücher's high spirits and his determination to beat Napoleon.
With the battle hanging in the balance Blücher's army intervened with decisive and crushing effect, his vanguard drawing off Napoleon's badly needed reserves, and his main body being instrumental in crushing French resistance. This victory led the way to a decisive victory through the relentless pursuit of the French by the Prussians. The two Coalition armies entered Paris on 7 July.[2
Prince Blücher remained in the French capital for a few months, but his age and infirmities compelled him to retire to his Silesian residence at Krieblowitz.[2] At the invitation of the British government, he made another state visit to England, to be formally thanked for his and his army's role in the Waterloo Campaign. He died at Krieblowitz on 12 September 1819, aged 77.[2]
Field Marshal Gebhard von Blücher
If Archduke Charles was a model of quiet competence tempered with restraint and caution, Blücher, also known as Marshal Vorwarts! (Forward!) was his opposite. Blücher was a hard charging cavalry officer who lived life as he waged war: Fast, furious and to excess. His wild disposition, which led to his dismissal from the Prussian Army by Frederick the Great himself, was later tempered with humility and by the time the Wars of the French Revolution had broken out he was a celebrated officer worshipped by his men. Blücher always favored the attack and his impetuosity was both his greatest strength and his greatest weakness. Stubbornness was the other great strength. After being hunted down by half the French Army following the Prussian cataclysm at Jena-Auerstedt, a surrounded Blücher only surrendered after having his positions stormed by the French and his escape cut-off. Blücher surrendered to Marshal Bernadotte and added to the surrender document "I only surrender because I have no bullets or bread."
Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, Fürst von Wahlstatt (German pronunciation: [ˈɡɛphaɐ̯t ˈleːbəʁɛçt fɔn ˈblʏçɐ]; 16 December 1742 – 12 September 1819), Graf (count), later elevated to Fürst (sovereign prince) von Wahlstatt, was a Prussian Generalfeldmarschall (field marshal). He earned his greatest recognition after leading his army against Napoleon I at the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig in 1813 and the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.
His military career began in 1758 as a hussar in the Swedish Army. He was captured by the Prussians in 1760 during the Pomeranian Campaign and thereafter joined the Prussian Army, serving as a hussar officer for Prussia during the remainder of the Seven Years' War. In 1773, Blücher was forced to resign by Frederick the Great for insubordination.
War broke out between Prussia and France again in 1813 and Blücher returned to active service at the age of 71. He was appointed full general over the Prussian field forces and clashed with Napoleon at the Battles of Lützen and Bautzen. Later he won a critical victory over the French at the Battle of Katzbach. Blücher commanded the Prussian Army of Silesia at the Battle of the Nations where Napoleon was decisively defeated. At the Battle of Ligny, he was severely injured and the Prussians retreated. After recovering, Blücher resumed command and joined Wellington at the Battle of Waterloo, with the intervention of Blücher's army playing a decisive role in the final allied victory.
Along with Paul von Hindenburg, he was the highest-decorated Prussian-German soldier in history: Blücher and Hindenburg are the only German military officers to have been awarded the Star of the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross.
Early life
Blücher was born on 16 December 1742 in Rostock a Baltic port in northern Germany then in the Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin,.[2] His father was a retired army captain, and his family had been landowners in northern Germany since at least the 13th century.[3]
He began his military career at the age of sixteen,[a] when he joined the Swedish Army as a hussar.[4] At the time, Sweden was at war with Prussia in the Seven Years' War. Blücher took part in the Pomeranian campaign of 1760, where Prussian Hussars captured him in a skirmish. The colonel of the Prussian regiment, Wilhelm Sebastian von Belling (a distant relative), was impressed with the young hussar and had him join his own regiment.[2][5]
Blücher took part in the later battles of the Seven Years' War, and as a hussar officer gained much experience in light cavalry work. In peace, however, his ardent spirit led him into excesses of all kinds, such as the mock execution of a priest suspected of supporting Polish uprisings in 1772. As a result, he was passed over for promotion to Major. Blücher submitted a rude letter of resignation in 1773, which Frederick the Great replied to with "Captain Blücher can take himself to the devil" (1773).[2]
Blücher settled down to farming. During Frederick the Great's life time, Blücher could not return to the army. However, the monarch died in 1786, and the following year Blücher was reinstated as a major in his old regiment, the Red Hussars. In 1793 and 1794, Blücher distinguished himself in cavalry actions against the French, and for his victory at Kirrweiler on 28 May 1794 he was promoted to major general. In 1801, he was made a lieutenant general.[2]
Napoleonic Wars
.jpg)
Marschall Vorwärts by Emil Hünten (1863).
At the double Battle of Jena-Auerstedt, Blücher fought at Auerstedt, repeatedly leading the charges of the Prussian cavalry, but without success. He led the remnant of his corps away to the north-west.[2] Reinforcing his numbers with a division previously commanded by Karl August, Grand Duke of Sax-Weimar, Blücher and his new chief of staff, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, reorganised his forces into two small corps totaling 21,000 men and 44 cannons.[7] Nevertheless, he was defeated by two French corps at the Battle of Lübeck [2] on 6 November. Blücher insisted that clauses be written in the capitulation document that he had had to surrender due to lack of provisions and ammunition,[2] and that his soldiers should be honoured by a French formation along the street. He was allowed to keep his sabre and to move freely, bound only by his word of honor.
Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher in Bautzen by Bogdan Willewalde (1885).
Following the start of the War of Liberation in the Spring of 1813, Blücher was again placed in high command, and he was present at Lützen and Bautzen. During the Summer truce, he worked on the organisation of the Prussian forces; when the war was resumed, he became commander-in-chief of the Army of Silesia, with August von Gneisenau and Karl von Müffling as his principal staff officers and 40,000 Prussians and 50,000 Russians under his command during the Autumn Campaign the most conspicuous military quality displayed by Blücher was his unrelenting energy.[2]
The irresolution and divergence of interests usual in Sixth Coalition armies found in him a restless opponent. He defeated Marshal MacDonald at the Katzbach, and by his victory over Marshal Marmont at Möckern led the way to the decisive defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig. Blücher's own army stormed Leipzig on the evening of the last day of the battle.[2] This was the fourth battle between Napoleon and Blücher, and the first that Blücher had won.[citation needed]
Old Blucher beating the Corsican Big Drum, George Cruikshank, 8 April 1814.
The Battle of Brienne and the Battle of La Rothière were the chief incidents of the first stage of the celebrated 1814 campaign in north-east France, and they were quickly followed by victories of Napoleon over Blücher at Champaubert, Vauchamps, and Montmirail.
Blücher infused some of his energy into the operations of the Prince Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia, and at last this army and the Army of Silesia marched in one body directly towards Paris. The victory of Montmartre, the entry of the allies into the French capital, and the overthrow of the First Empire were the direct consequences.[2]
Blücher was inclined to punish the city of Paris severely for the sufferings of Prussia at the hands of the French armies, but the allied commanders intervened. Blowing up the Jena Bridge near the Champ de Mars[2] was said by the Duke of Wellington to have been one of his contemplated acts.
In gratitude for his victories in 1814, King Frederick William III of Prussia created Blücher Prince of Wahlstatt (in Silesia on the Katzbach battlefield).[2]
Hundred Days and later life
The Prussian attack on Plancenoit during the Battle of Waterloo, painted by Adolph Northen
After the war Blücher retired to Silesia. However, the return of Napoleon from Elba he was put in command of the Army of the Lower Rhine, with General August von Gneisenau as his chief of staff. At the outset of the Waterloo Campaign of 1815 the Prussians sustained a serious defeat at Ligny (16 June), in the course of which the old field marshal lay trapped under his dead horse for several hours and was repeatedly ridden over by cavalry, his life only saved by the devotion of his aide-de-camp Count Nostitz, who threw a greatcoat over his commander, in order to obscure Blücher's rank and identity from the passing French. As Blücher was unable to resume command for some hours Gneisenau took command, drew off the defeated army and rallied it.[2] In spite of Gneisenau's distrust of Wellington, he obeyed Blücher's last orders to direct the army's retreat towards Wavre, rather than Liege, in order to keep alive the possibility of joining the Prussian and Wellington's Anglo-allied armies together.[13]
Blücher led his army on a tortuous march along muddy paths, arriving on the field of Waterloo in the late afternoon. In spite of his age, the pain of his wounds, and the effort it must have taken for him to remain on horseback, Bernard Cornwell states that several soldiers attested to Blücher's high spirits and his determination to beat Napoleon.
With the battle hanging in the balance Blücher's army intervened with decisive and crushing effect, his vanguard drawing off Napoleon's badly needed reserves, and his main body being instrumental in crushing French resistance. This victory led the way to a decisive victory through the relentless pursuit of the French by the Prussians. The two Coalition armies entered Paris on 7 July.[2
Prince Blücher remained in the French capital for a few months, but his age and infirmities compelled him to retire to his Silesian residence at Krieblowitz.[2] At the invitation of the British government, he made another state visit to England, to be formally thanked for his and his army's role in the Waterloo Campaign. He died at Krieblowitz on 12 September 1819, aged 77.[2]
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Really have no way of knowing how/why it was removed, but if I had to guess, I do think Trump has a nationalist streak of his own that probably led to him removing it himself. I would question whether any of "Bannons' people" actually had access to the speech after Mattis/McMaster/Tillerson did given that it came at the end of a foreign trip, and I don't know if any of Bannon's people were even there at all.
It is entirely possible that Bannon put a bug in Trump's ear before the trip, but I think the actual removal was by Trump himself. But, that's just a WAG.
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@The Human Q-Tip, @Marcus
I finished up Leggiere's biography on Field Marshal Blücher. I hadn't noticed until now but Leggiere also wrote the books I have on the Leipzig Campaign and Napoleon's infatuation with Berlin. He takes a very Pro-Prussian view. Have you read his books, 'Tip? I know you've studied many of Napoleon's later campaigns.
Despite Leggiere's very friendly tone on Blücher, I found that old Marshal Vorwart was actually an extremely unstable and reckless commander and was at his best when restrained. From the period of his defeat and capture at the hands of Marshall Bernadotte at Lübeck in 1806, to the time Napoleon's Grand Armee was defeated in Russia in 1812, he continually tried to goad his master, King Frederick William III, into a disastrous war with France when Prussia had army of only 42,000 and no allies. He repeatedly threatened to invade French occupied areas to trigger a war and often blackmailed the King with threats of resignation. Needless to say, such actions would have doomed Prussia and belies terrible judgement beyond the tactical level. That Leggiere continually praises Blücher, and the Prussian strategy during the Leipzig Campaign, while attacking the record of Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte, smacks of Prussian homerism.
Given Napoleon's preferred strategy of the Battle of the Central Position, and the geography of the theater of operations, I believe aggressive advances advocated by Blücher with his Army of Silesia, and Von Bülow with the Army of the North under Bernadotte, would have played right into Napoleon's hands. The closer each of the two separate armies came to Napoleon, the easier it would have been for him to attack one army, than the other, by rapid shifting of his outnumbered forces. Because Bernadotte and Allied Command refused to accede to Prussia's demands, and kept the three Allied armies well-distanced from one another, Napoleon was unable to attack each Army in rapid succession due to geographic distance, and, more importantly, was unable to come to the aid of Marshals Oudinot and Ney, whom he tasked with attacking Berlin and were defeated by Bernadotte, and Vandamme who was routed at Kulm. Those defeats robbed Napoleon of the fruits of his brilliant victories at Leutzen, Bautzen and Dresden and led to the disaster of Leipzig.
General von Bülow's (center of the Infantry Square) Prussian Corps held Marshal Ney's Army of Berlin long enough to crumble the French lines. The arrival of Crown Prince Karl Johan's (mounted, center) Swedish Corps completed the rout.
The question is whether Blücher's strategic shortcomings were compensated by his tactical prowess. Would Waterloo have happened if the Prussians were knocked out of the war due to the destruction of the Army of Silesia in 1813?
I have not read Leggiere -- you are the resident Napoleonnic master. But I agree with you about Blucher -- the overall coalition strategy developed at Trachenberg made much more sense than simply a straight-up fight. The various coalitions repeatedly had failed to take full advantage of their numerical superiority because they let Napoleon defeat them in detail. It was also an intelligent response to Napoleon's preferred strategy of advancing his corps separated fairly widely, then concentrating quickly at a single point. Defeating the corps separately was death by a thousand cuts.
Blucher was very valuable even with his strategic shortcomings, though. As long as you told him where to fight, you know he'd do it competently.
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I think I am going to greatly expand the Wiki entry for the Trachenberg Plan. Right now it is just a paragraph. It had no citations as of last night. Fixed that this morning.
It is actually very interesting how the plan came together considering all the competing interests amongst the various coalition members.
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You're up, Captain 'Tip for a new leader. @The Human Q-Tip
Anyone can post a military leader of the day. @TopGun, @Marcus, @Randolphkeys, @AZ_
Anyone can post a military leader of the day. @TopGun, @Marcus, @Randolphkeys, @AZ_
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Richard the Lionheart
I think this guy was one of the most "modern" generals of the Middle Ages. Very much a pure professional, which was rare considering the time. Excelled as a strategist, as a tactical commander, and as a logistician, and personally designed one of the finest fortresses ever build -- Chateau Galliard.
Richard I (8 September 1157 – 6 April 1199) was King of England from 6 July 1189 until his death. He also ruled as Duke of Normandy, Aquitaine and Gascony, Lord of Cyprus, Count of Poitiers, Anjou, Maine, and Nantes, and Overlord of Brittany at various times during the same period. He was known as Richard Cœur de Lion or Richard the Lionheart because of his reputation as a great military leader and warrior. He was also known in Occitan as Oc e No (Yes and No), because of his reputation for terseness.
By the age of 16, Richard had taken command of his own army, putting down rebellions in Poitou against his father. Richard was a central Christian commander during the Third Crusade, leading the campaign after the departure of Philip II of France and scoring considerable victories against his Muslim counterpart, Saladin, although he did not retake Jerusalem from Saladin. The key battle of the campaign was at Arsuf, and a perfect example of his excellence as a general.
Battle of Arsuf
Prelude
Following the capture of Acre in 1191, Richard was aware that he needed to capture the port of Jaffa before making an attempt on Jerusalem, Richard began to march down the coast from Acre towards Jaffa in August 1191. Saladin, whose main objective was to prevent the recapture of Jerusalem, mobilised his army to attempt to stop the Crusaders' advance. Richard organized the advance with attention to detail. A large part of the Egyptian fleet had been captured at the fall of Acre, and with no threat from this quarter he could march south along the coast with the sea always protecting his right flank.[4]
Mindful of the lessons of the disaster at Hattin, Richard knew that his army's greatest need was water and that heat exhaustion was its greatest danger. Although pressed for time he proceeded at a relatively slow pace. He marched his army only in the morning before the heat of the day, making frequent rest stops, always beside sources of water. The fleet sailed down the coast in close support, a source of supplies and a refuge for the wounded. Aware of the ever-present danger of enemy raiders and the possibility of hit-and-run attacks, he kept the column in tight formation with a core of twelve mounted regiments, each with a hundred knights. The infantry marched on the landward flank, covering the flanks of the horsemen and affording them some protection from missiles. The outermost ranks of the infantry were composed of crossbowmen. On the seaward side was the baggage and also units of infantry being rested from the continuous harassment inflicted by Saladin's forces. Richard wisely rotated his infantry units to keep them relatively fresh.
Though provoked and tormented by the skirmish tactics of Saladin's archers, Richard's generalship ensured that order and discipline were maintained under the most difficult of circumstances. Baha al-Din ibn Shaddad, the Muslim chronicler and eyewitness, describes the march:
"The Moslems discharged arrows at them from all sides to annoy them, and force them to charge: but in this they were unsuccessful. These men exercised wonderful self-control; they went on their way without any hurry, whilst their ships followed their line of march along the coast, and in this manner they reached their halting-place."
Battle:
At dawn on 7 September 1191, as Richard's forces began moving out of camp enemy scouts were visible in all directions, hinting that Saladin's whole army lay hidden in the woodland. King Richard took especial pains over the disposition of his army. The probable posts of greatest danger, at the front and especially the rear of the column, were given to the military orders. They had the most experience of fighting in the East, were arguably the most disciplined, and were the only formations which included Turcopole cavalry who fought like the Turkish horse archers of the Ayyubid army. Richard's army likely was outnumbered by 3-1.
The van of the Crusader army consisted of the Knights Templar under Robert de Sablé. They were followed by three units composed of Richard's own subjects, the Angevins and Bretons, then the Poitevins including Guy of Lusignan, titular King of Jerusalem, and lastly the English and Normans who had charge of the great standard mounted on its waggon. The next seven corps were made up of the French, the Flemmings, the barons of Outremer and small contingents of crusaders from other lands. Forming the rearguard were the Knights Hospitaller led by Garnier de Nablus. The twelve corps were organised into five larger formations, though their precise distribution is unknown. Additionally, a small troop, under the leadership of Henry II of Champagne, was detached to scout towards the hills, and a squadron of picked knights under King Richard and Hugh of Burgundy, the leader of the French contingent, was detailed to ride up and down the column checking on Saladin's movements and ensuring that their own ranks were kept in order.
The first Saracen attack did not come until all the crusaders had left their camp and were moving towards Arsuf. The Ayyubid army then burst out of the woodland. The front of the army was composed of dense swarms of skirmishers, both horse and foot, Bedouin, Sudanese archers and the lighter types of Turkish horse archers. Behind these were the ordered squadrons of armoured heavy cavalry: Saladin's mamluks (also termed ghulams), Kurdish troops, and the contingents of the emirs and princes of Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia. The army was divided into three parts, left and right wings and centre. Saladin directed his army from beneath his banners, surrounded by his bodyguard and accompanied by his kettle-drummers.
In an attempt to destroy the cohesion of the Crusader army and unsettle their resolve, the Ayyubid onslaught was accompanied by the clashing of cymbals and gongs, trumpets blowing and men screaming war-cries.
"In truth, our people, so few in number, were hemmed in by the multitudes of the Saracens, that they had no means of escape, if they tried; neither did they seem to have valour sufficient to withstand so many foes, nay, they were shut in, like a flock of sheep in the jaws of wolves, with nothing but the sky above, and the enemy all around them."
The repeated Ayyubid harrying attacks followed the same pattern: the Bedouin and Nubians on foot launched arrows and javelins into the enemy lines, before parting to allow the mounted archers to advance, attack and wheel off, a well-practiced technique. Crusader crossbowmen responded, when this was possible, although the chief task among the Crusaders was simply to preserve their ranks in the face of sustained provocation. When the incessant attacks of skirmishers failed to have the desired effect, the weight of the attack was switched to the rear of the Crusader column, with the Hospitallers coming under the greatest pressure. Here the right wing of the Ayyubid army made a desperate attack on the squadron of Hospitaller knights and the infantry corps covering them. The Hospitallers could be attacked from both their rear and flank. Many of the Hospitaller infantry had to walk backwards in order to keep their faces, and shields, to the enemy.
All Saladin's best efforts could not dislocate the Crusader column, or halt its advance in the direction of Arsuf. Richard was determined to hold his army together, forcing the enemy to exhaust themselves in repeated charges, with the intention of holding his knights for a concentrated counter-attack at just the right moment. There were risks in this, because the army was not only marching under severe enemy provocation, but the troops were suffering from heat and thirst. Just as serious, the Saracens were killing so many horses that some of Richard's own knights began to wonder if a counter-strike would be possible. Many of the unhorsed knights joined the infantry.
Just as the vanguard entered Arsuf in the middle of the afternoon, the Hospitaller crossbowmen to the rear were having to load and fire walking backwards. Inevitably they lost cohesion, and the enemy was quick to take advantage of this opportunity, moving into any gap wielding their swords and maces. For the Crusaders, the Battle of Arsuf had now entered a critical stage. Garnier de Nablus repeatedly pleaded with Richard to be allowed to attack. He was refused, the Master was ordered to maintain position and await the signal for a general assault, six clear trumpet blasts. Richard knew that the charge of his knights needed to be reserved until the Ayyubid army was fully committed, closely engaged, and the Saracens' horses had begun to tire. Goaded beyond endurance, the Master and another knight, Baldwin de Carron, thrust their way through their own infantry and charged into the Saracen ranks with a cry of “St. George!”; they were then followed by the rest of the Hospitaller knights. Moved by this example, the French knights of the corps immediately preceding the Hospitallers also charged.
The precipitate action of the Hospitallers could have caused Richard's whole strategy to unravel. However, he recognized that the counterattack, once started, had to be supported by all his army and ordered the signal for a general charge to be sounded. The Frankish infantry opened gaps in their ranks for the knights to pass through and the attack naturally developed in echelon from the rear to the van. To the soldiers of Saladin's army, as Baha al-Din noted, the sudden change from passivity to ferocious activity on the part of the Crusaders was disconcerting, and appeared to be the result of a preconceived plan.
Having already been engaged in close combat with the rear of the Crusader column, the right wing of the Ayyubid army was in compact formation and too close to their enemy to avoid the full impact of the charge. As a result, they suffered great numbers of casualties, the knights taking a bloody revenge for all they had had to endure earlier in the battle. Baha al-Din noted that "the rout was complete." He had been in the centre division of Saladin's army, when it turned in flight he looked to join the left wing, but found that it also was in rapid flight. Noting the disintegration of the right wing he finally sought Saladin's personal banners, but found only seventeen members of the bodyguard and a lone drummer still with them.
Being aware that an over-rash pursuit was the greatest danger when fighting armies trained in the fluid tactics of the Turks, Richard halted the charge after about 1 mile (1.6 km) had been covered. The right flank Crusader units, which had formed the van of the column, including the English and Normans had not yet been heavily engaged in close combat, and they formed a reserve on which the rest regrouped. Freed from the pressure of being actively pursued, many of the Ayyubid troops turned to cut down those of the knights who had unwisely drawn ahead of the rest. Once their squadrons were back in order, Richard led his knights in a second charge and the forces of Saladin broke once again.
Alert to the danger presented to his scattered ranks, Richard, prudent as ever, halted and regrouped his forces once more after a further pursuit. The Ayyubid cavalry turned once again, showing they still had stomach to renew the fight. However, a third and final charge caused them to scatter into the woodland where they dispersed into the hills in all directions, showing no inclination to continue the conflict. Richard led his cavalry back to Arsuf where the infantry had pitched camp. During the night the Saracen dead were looted
Aftermath
As always with medieval battles, losses are difficult to assess with any precision. The Christian chroniclers claim that Saladin's force lost 32 emirs and 7,000 men, but it is possible that the true number may have been fewer. Baha al-Din mentions only three deaths amongst the leaders of the Ayyubid army: Musek, Grand-Emir of the Kurds, Kaimaz el Adeli and Lighush. King Richard's own dead are said to have numbered no more than 700. The only Crusader leader of note to be killed was James d'Avesnes.[43][44]
Arsuf was an important victory. The Ayyubid army was not destroyed, despite the considerable casualties it suffered, but it did rout; this was considered shameful by the Muslims and boosted the morale of the Crusaders. A contemporary opinion stated that, had Richard been able to choose the moment to unleash his knights, rather than having to react to the actions of an insubordinate unit commander, the Crusader victory might have been much more effective. Possibly being so complete a victory that it would have disabled Saladin's forces for a long time.[45][46] After the rout Saladin was able to regroup and attempted to resume his skirmishing method of warfare but to little effect; shaken by the Crusaders' sudden and devastatingly effective counterattack at Arsuf, he was no longer willing to risk a further full-scale attack. Arsuf had dented Saladin's reputation as an invincible warrior, and proved Richard's courage as a soldier and his skill as a commander. Richard was able to take, defend and hold Jaffa – a strategically crucial move toward securing Jerusalem. Also Saladin had to evacuate and demolish most of the fortresses of southern Palestine: Ascalon, Gaza, Blanche-Garde, Lydda and Ramleh, as he realised he could not hold them. Richard took the fortress of Darum, the sole fortress that Saladin had garrisoned, with only his own household troops, so low had Saracen morale been reduced. By depriving Saladin of the coast, Richard seriously threatened Saladin's hold on Jerusalem.[47][48]
Although the Third Crusade, in the end, failed to retake Jerusalem, a three-year truce was eventually negotiated with Saladin. The truce, known as the Treaty of Jaffa, ensured that Christian pilgrims from the west would once again be allowed to visit Jerusalem. Saladin also recognised the Crusaders' control of the Levantine coast as far south as Jaffa. Both sides had become exhausted by the struggle, Richard needed to return to Europe in order to protect his patrimony from the aggression of Philip of France, and Palestine was in a ruinous state.
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Military Leader of the Day
Basil II, Emperor of Rome "The Mother-Fucking Bulgar Slayer"
Through-out the Roman Empire's 1500+ year history, few Emperors ever distinguished themselves so brilliantly on the battlefield and in their iron-willed determination to preserve their borders no matter the cost. He founded the Varangian Guard after contracting a marriage alliance with the Kievan Rus; an act of great historic importance as it represented the Christianization of Russia. One of the greatest commanders of the Middle Ages, and perhaps the greatest Byzantine general that wasn't Belisaurius, Basil's six-decade reign as warrior-Emperor started poorly with a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Bulgarian Tsar Samuel. The defeat changed Basil from a libertine womanizer, overconfident in his abilities, into a man who disavowed all comforts and dedicated himself solely to duty. Basil's long war was characterized by a steady and annihilating advance where he never fought a battle where he had not chosen the time and place. In the end, he utterly overthrew the power of the Bulgars and would forever go down in history as the perpetrator of the greatest act of psychological warfare in history. As described by Gibbon:
His cruelty inflicted a cool and exquisite vengeance on the fifteen thousand captives who had been guilty of the defence of their country. They were deprived of sight, but to one of each hundred a single eye was left, that he might conduct his blind century to the presence of their king. Their king is said to have expired of grief and horror; the nation was awed by this terrible example; the Bulgarians were swept away from their settlements, and circumscribed within a narrow province; the surviving chiefs bequeathed to their children the advice of patience and the duty of revenge.
Basil II Basileios II; (958 – 15 December 1025) was a Byzantine Emperor from the Macedonian dynasty who reigned from 10 January 976 to 15 December 1025.
The early years of his long reign were dominated by civil war against powerful generals from the Anatolian aristocracy. Following their submission, Basil oversaw the stabilization and expansion of the eastern frontier of the Byzantine Empire, and above all, the final and complete subjugation of Bulgaria, the Empire's foremost European foe, after a prolonged struggle. For this he was nicknamed the Bulgar Slayer (Greek: Βουλγαροκτόνος, Boulgaroktonos), by which he is popularly known. At his death, the Empire stretched from southern Italy to the Caucasus and from the Danube to the borders of Palestine, its greatest territorial extent since the Muslim conquests four centuries earlier. His reign is therefore often seen as the medieval apogee of the Empire.
Despite near-constant warfare, Basil also showed himself a capable administrator, reducing the power of the great land-owning families who dominated the Empire's administration and military, while filling the Empire's treasury.
Birth and Childhood
Basil was the son of Emperor Romanos II and Empress Theophano, whose maternal family was of Laconian Greek origin.
In 960, Basil was associated on the throne by his father, who then died in 963, when Basil was only five years old. Because he and his brother, the future Emperor Constantine VIII (ruled 1025–1028), were too young to reign in their own right, Basil's mother Theophano married one of Romanos' leading generals, Nikephoros Phokas, who took the throne as the Emperor Nikephoros II several months later in 963. Nikephoros was murdered in 969 by his nephew John I Tzimiskes, who then became emperor and reigned for seven years. When Tzimiskes died on 10 January 976, Basil II finally took the throne as senior emperor.
Rebellions in Anatolia and Alliance with Rus'
In the early years of his reign, administration remained in the hands of the eunuch Basil Lekapenos (an illegitimate son of Emperor Romanos I), President of the Senate, a wily and gifted politician who hoped that the young emperors would be his puppets. Basil waited and watched without interfering, devoting himself to learning the details of administrative business and military science.
As a result of the failures of his immediate predecessors, Basil II found himself with a serious problem at the outset of his reign as two members of the wealthy military elite of Anatolia, Bardas Skleros and Bardas Phokas, had sufficient means to undertake open rebellion against his authority. These rebellions had a profound effect on Basil's outlook and methods of governance. The historian Psellus describes the defeated Bardas Skleros giving Basil the following advice: "Cut down the governors who become over-proud. Let no generals on campaign have too many resources. Exhaust them with unjust exactions, to keep them busied with their own affairs. Admit no woman to the imperial councils. Be accessible to no one. Share with few your most intimate plans."
In order to defeat these dangerous revolts, Basil formed an alliance with Prince Vladimir I of Kiev, who in 988 had captured Chersonesos, the main Imperial base in the Crimea. Vladimir offered to evacuate Chersonesos and to supply 6,000 of his soldiers as reinforcements to Basil. In exchange he demanded to be married to Basil's younger sister Anna (963–1011). At first, Basil hesitated. When Vladimir promised to baptize himself and to convert his people to Christianity, Basil finally agreed. Vladimir and Anna were married in the Crimea in 989. Basil, with support of the still loyal Byzantine Navy, landed on the Asian side of the Straights at night with his new Viking Army next to the enemy camp. In a surprise attack, his Varangians cheerfully hacked their way through Phokas' shocked rebels with Basil joining his troops in the carnage, carrying the Icon of the Virgin in one hand, and a broadsword in the other. These troops were later organized into the Varangian Guard.
This marriage had important long-term implications, marking the beginning of the process by which the Grand Duchy of Moscow many centuries later would proclaim itself "The Third Rome" and claim the political and cultural heritage of the Byzantine Empire.
Campaigns against the Fatimid Caliphate
Basil later in life in a monastery relief
The internal strife quelled, Basil II turned his attention to other enemies of the Empire. The Byzantine civil wars had weakened the Empire's position in the east, and the gains of Nikephoros II Phokas and John I Tzimiskes had nearly been lost to the Fatimids.
Basil intervened personally in the East: in a lightning campaign he rode with his army through Asia Minor in sixteen days and reached Aleppo in April 995, forcing the Fatimid army to retreat without giving battle. The Byzantines besieged Tripolis unsuccessfully and occupied Tartus, which they refortified and garrisoned with Armenian troops. The Fatimid caliph al-Aziz now prepared to take the field in person against the Byzantines and initiated large-scale preparations, but they were cut short upon his death.
Byzantine Conquest of Bulgaria
Basil also sought to restore territories the Empire had lost long before. At the start of the second millennium, he took on his greatest adversary, Samuel of Bulgaria. Bulgaria had been partly subjugated by John I Tzimiskes after the invasion of Svyatoslav I of Kiev, but parts of the country had remained outside Byzantine control, under the leadership of Samuel and his brothers.
As the Bulgars had been raiding Byzantine lands since 976. Basil used a respite from his conflict with the nobility to lead an army of 30,000 men into Bulgaria and besiege Sredets (Sofia) in 986. Taking losses and worried about the loyalty of some of his governors, Basil lifted the siege and headed back for Thrace, but he fell into an ambush and suffered a serious defeat at the Battle of the Gates of Trajan. Basil escaped with the help of his Varangian Guard. Basil II concluded a treaty with Pietro Orseolo II under terms reducing Venice's custom duties in Constantinople from 30 nomismata to 17 nomismata. In return the Venetians agreed to transport Byzantine troops to southern Italy in times of war.[23]
During the years when Basil was distracted with internal rebellions and recovering the military situation on his eastern frontier, Samuel had extended his rule from the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea, recovering most of the lands that had been Bulgarian before the invasion of Svyatoslav. He also conducted damaging raids into Byzantine territory as far as central Greece.
Triumph of Basil II through the Forum of Constantine, from the Madrid Skylitzes
Beginning in 1000, Basil II was free to focus on a war of outright conquest against Bulgaria, a war he prosecuted with grinding persistence and strategic insight. In 1000 the Byzantine generals Nikephoros Xiphias and Theodorokanos took the old Bulgarian capital of Great Preslav and the towns of Lesser Preslav and Pliskova.[25] In 1001, Basil himself, operating from Thessalonica, was able to regain control of Vodena, Verrhoia, and Servia.[26] The following year he based his army in Philippopolis and occupied the length of the military road from the western Haemus Mountains to the Danube, thereby cutting off communications between Samuel's Macedonian heartland and Moesia. Following this success Basil laid siege to Vidin, which eventually fell following a prolonged resistance.[27] Samuel reacted to the Byzantine campaign with a daring stroke; he launched a large-scale raid into the heart of Byzantine Thrace and surprised the major city of Adrianople.
In 1014 Basil was ready to launch a campaign aimed at destroying Bulgarian resistance. On 29 July 1014, Basil II and his general Nikephoros Xiphias outmanoeuvred the Bulgarian army, which was defending one of the fortified passes, in the Battle of Kleidion. Samuel avoided capture only through the valour of his son Gabriel. Having crushed the Bulgarians, Basil exerted his vengeance by cruelty - he was said to have captured 15,000 prisoners and blinded 99 of every 100 men, leaving one one-eyed man in each cohort to lead the rest back to their ruler. Samuel was physically struck down by the dreadful apparition of his blinded army and died two days later, on 6 October 1014, after suffering a stroke. This victory over the Bulgarians, and the later submission of the Serbs, fulfilled one of Basil's goals, as the Empire regained its ancient Danubian frontier for the first time in 400 years.
The neighbouring rulers of Croatia, Krešimir III and Gojslav, who were previously allies of Bulgaria, accepted Basil's supremacy in order to avoid the same fate as Bulgaria; the emperor warmly received their offers of vassalage and awarded them the honorary title of patrician.
Later Years
Basil II returned in triumph to Constantinople, then promptly went east and attacked the Georgian Kingdom of Tao-Klarjeti. He later secured the annexation of the sub-kingdoms of Armenia along with a promise that its capital and surrounding regions would be willed to Byzantium following the death of its king Hovhannes-Smbat. In 1021, he also secured the cession of the Kingdom of Vaspurakan by its king, Seneqerim-John, in exchange for estates in Sebasteia. Basil created in those highlands a strongly fortified frontier, which, if his successors had been capable, should have proved an effective barrier against the invasions of the Seljuk Turks. In the meantime, other Byzantine forces restored much of Southern Italy, lost over the previous 150 years.
Basil was preparing a military expedition to recover the island of Sicily when he died, on 15 December 1025. Basil was to be buried in the last sarcophagus available in the rotunda of Constantine I in the Church of the Holy Apostles. However, he had later asked his brother and successor Constantine VIII to be buried in the Church of St. John the Theologian (i.e. the Evangelist), at the Hebdomon Palace complex, outside the walls of Constantinople. The epitaph on his tomb celebrated Basil's campaigns and victories. During the pillage of 1204, Basil's grave was desecrated by the invading Crusaders of the Fourth Crusade.
Legacy
The Byzantine Empire at the death of Basil II in 1025
Basil was a stocky man of less than average stature who, nevertheless, cut a majestic figure on horseback. He had light blue eyes and strongly arched eyebrows; in later life his beard became scant but his sidewhiskers were luxuriant and he had a habit of rolling his whiskers between his fingers when deep in thought or angry. He was not a fluent speaker and had a loud laugh that convulsed his whole frame. As a mature man he had ascetic tastes and cared little for the pomp and ceremony of the Imperial court, typically holding court dressed in military regalia. Still, he was a capable administrator, who, uniquely among the soldier-emperors, left a full treasury upon his death.
He was worshipped by his army, as he spent most of his reign campaigning with them instead of sending orders from the distant palaces of Constantinople, as had most of his predecessors. He lived the life of a soldier to the point of eating the same daily rations as any other member of the army. Besides being called the "Father of the Army", he was also popular with country farmers.
The Byzantine Empire under Basil II probably had a population of about 18 million people. By 1025, Basil II (with an annual revenue of 7,000,000 nomismata) was able to amass 14,400,000 nomismata (or 200,000 pounds of gold) for the Imperial treasury due to his prudent management.
@The Human Q-Tip @TopGun @Marcus
Basil II, Emperor of Rome "The Mother-Fucking Bulgar Slayer"
Through-out the Roman Empire's 1500+ year history, few Emperors ever distinguished themselves so brilliantly on the battlefield and in their iron-willed determination to preserve their borders no matter the cost. He founded the Varangian Guard after contracting a marriage alliance with the Kievan Rus; an act of great historic importance as it represented the Christianization of Russia. One of the greatest commanders of the Middle Ages, and perhaps the greatest Byzantine general that wasn't Belisaurius, Basil's six-decade reign as warrior-Emperor started poorly with a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Bulgarian Tsar Samuel. The defeat changed Basil from a libertine womanizer, overconfident in his abilities, into a man who disavowed all comforts and dedicated himself solely to duty. Basil's long war was characterized by a steady and annihilating advance where he never fought a battle where he had not chosen the time and place. In the end, he utterly overthrew the power of the Bulgars and would forever go down in history as the perpetrator of the greatest act of psychological warfare in history. As described by Gibbon:
His cruelty inflicted a cool and exquisite vengeance on the fifteen thousand captives who had been guilty of the defence of their country. They were deprived of sight, but to one of each hundred a single eye was left, that he might conduct his blind century to the presence of their king. Their king is said to have expired of grief and horror; the nation was awed by this terrible example; the Bulgarians were swept away from their settlements, and circumscribed within a narrow province; the surviving chiefs bequeathed to their children the advice of patience and the duty of revenge.
Basil II Basileios II; (958 – 15 December 1025) was a Byzantine Emperor from the Macedonian dynasty who reigned from 10 January 976 to 15 December 1025.
The early years of his long reign were dominated by civil war against powerful generals from the Anatolian aristocracy. Following their submission, Basil oversaw the stabilization and expansion of the eastern frontier of the Byzantine Empire, and above all, the final and complete subjugation of Bulgaria, the Empire's foremost European foe, after a prolonged struggle. For this he was nicknamed the Bulgar Slayer (Greek: Βουλγαροκτόνος, Boulgaroktonos), by which he is popularly known. At his death, the Empire stretched from southern Italy to the Caucasus and from the Danube to the borders of Palestine, its greatest territorial extent since the Muslim conquests four centuries earlier. His reign is therefore often seen as the medieval apogee of the Empire.
Despite near-constant warfare, Basil also showed himself a capable administrator, reducing the power of the great land-owning families who dominated the Empire's administration and military, while filling the Empire's treasury.
Birth and Childhood
Basil was the son of Emperor Romanos II and Empress Theophano, whose maternal family was of Laconian Greek origin.
In 960, Basil was associated on the throne by his father, who then died in 963, when Basil was only five years old. Because he and his brother, the future Emperor Constantine VIII (ruled 1025–1028), were too young to reign in their own right, Basil's mother Theophano married one of Romanos' leading generals, Nikephoros Phokas, who took the throne as the Emperor Nikephoros II several months later in 963. Nikephoros was murdered in 969 by his nephew John I Tzimiskes, who then became emperor and reigned for seven years. When Tzimiskes died on 10 January 976, Basil II finally took the throne as senior emperor.
Rebellions in Anatolia and Alliance with Rus'
In the early years of his reign, administration remained in the hands of the eunuch Basil Lekapenos (an illegitimate son of Emperor Romanos I), President of the Senate, a wily and gifted politician who hoped that the young emperors would be his puppets. Basil waited and watched without interfering, devoting himself to learning the details of administrative business and military science.
As a result of the failures of his immediate predecessors, Basil II found himself with a serious problem at the outset of his reign as two members of the wealthy military elite of Anatolia, Bardas Skleros and Bardas Phokas, had sufficient means to undertake open rebellion against his authority. These rebellions had a profound effect on Basil's outlook and methods of governance. The historian Psellus describes the defeated Bardas Skleros giving Basil the following advice: "Cut down the governors who become over-proud. Let no generals on campaign have too many resources. Exhaust them with unjust exactions, to keep them busied with their own affairs. Admit no woman to the imperial councils. Be accessible to no one. Share with few your most intimate plans."
In order to defeat these dangerous revolts, Basil formed an alliance with Prince Vladimir I of Kiev, who in 988 had captured Chersonesos, the main Imperial base in the Crimea. Vladimir offered to evacuate Chersonesos and to supply 6,000 of his soldiers as reinforcements to Basil. In exchange he demanded to be married to Basil's younger sister Anna (963–1011). At first, Basil hesitated. When Vladimir promised to baptize himself and to convert his people to Christianity, Basil finally agreed. Vladimir and Anna were married in the Crimea in 989. Basil, with support of the still loyal Byzantine Navy, landed on the Asian side of the Straights at night with his new Viking Army next to the enemy camp. In a surprise attack, his Varangians cheerfully hacked their way through Phokas' shocked rebels with Basil joining his troops in the carnage, carrying the Icon of the Virgin in one hand, and a broadsword in the other. These troops were later organized into the Varangian Guard.
This marriage had important long-term implications, marking the beginning of the process by which the Grand Duchy of Moscow many centuries later would proclaim itself "The Third Rome" and claim the political and cultural heritage of the Byzantine Empire.
Campaigns against the Fatimid Caliphate
Basil later in life in a monastery relief
The internal strife quelled, Basil II turned his attention to other enemies of the Empire. The Byzantine civil wars had weakened the Empire's position in the east, and the gains of Nikephoros II Phokas and John I Tzimiskes had nearly been lost to the Fatimids.
Basil intervened personally in the East: in a lightning campaign he rode with his army through Asia Minor in sixteen days and reached Aleppo in April 995, forcing the Fatimid army to retreat without giving battle. The Byzantines besieged Tripolis unsuccessfully and occupied Tartus, which they refortified and garrisoned with Armenian troops. The Fatimid caliph al-Aziz now prepared to take the field in person against the Byzantines and initiated large-scale preparations, but they were cut short upon his death.
Byzantine Conquest of Bulgaria
Basil also sought to restore territories the Empire had lost long before. At the start of the second millennium, he took on his greatest adversary, Samuel of Bulgaria. Bulgaria had been partly subjugated by John I Tzimiskes after the invasion of Svyatoslav I of Kiev, but parts of the country had remained outside Byzantine control, under the leadership of Samuel and his brothers.
As the Bulgars had been raiding Byzantine lands since 976. Basil used a respite from his conflict with the nobility to lead an army of 30,000 men into Bulgaria and besiege Sredets (Sofia) in 986. Taking losses and worried about the loyalty of some of his governors, Basil lifted the siege and headed back for Thrace, but he fell into an ambush and suffered a serious defeat at the Battle of the Gates of Trajan. Basil escaped with the help of his Varangian Guard. Basil II concluded a treaty with Pietro Orseolo II under terms reducing Venice's custom duties in Constantinople from 30 nomismata to 17 nomismata. In return the Venetians agreed to transport Byzantine troops to southern Italy in times of war.[23]
During the years when Basil was distracted with internal rebellions and recovering the military situation on his eastern frontier, Samuel had extended his rule from the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea, recovering most of the lands that had been Bulgarian before the invasion of Svyatoslav. He also conducted damaging raids into Byzantine territory as far as central Greece.
Triumph of Basil II through the Forum of Constantine, from the Madrid Skylitzes
Beginning in 1000, Basil II was free to focus on a war of outright conquest against Bulgaria, a war he prosecuted with grinding persistence and strategic insight. In 1000 the Byzantine generals Nikephoros Xiphias and Theodorokanos took the old Bulgarian capital of Great Preslav and the towns of Lesser Preslav and Pliskova.[25] In 1001, Basil himself, operating from Thessalonica, was able to regain control of Vodena, Verrhoia, and Servia.[26] The following year he based his army in Philippopolis and occupied the length of the military road from the western Haemus Mountains to the Danube, thereby cutting off communications between Samuel's Macedonian heartland and Moesia. Following this success Basil laid siege to Vidin, which eventually fell following a prolonged resistance.[27] Samuel reacted to the Byzantine campaign with a daring stroke; he launched a large-scale raid into the heart of Byzantine Thrace and surprised the major city of Adrianople.
In 1014 Basil was ready to launch a campaign aimed at destroying Bulgarian resistance. On 29 July 1014, Basil II and his general Nikephoros Xiphias outmanoeuvred the Bulgarian army, which was defending one of the fortified passes, in the Battle of Kleidion. Samuel avoided capture only through the valour of his son Gabriel. Having crushed the Bulgarians, Basil exerted his vengeance by cruelty - he was said to have captured 15,000 prisoners and blinded 99 of every 100 men, leaving one one-eyed man in each cohort to lead the rest back to their ruler. Samuel was physically struck down by the dreadful apparition of his blinded army and died two days later, on 6 October 1014, after suffering a stroke. This victory over the Bulgarians, and the later submission of the Serbs, fulfilled one of Basil's goals, as the Empire regained its ancient Danubian frontier for the first time in 400 years.
The neighbouring rulers of Croatia, Krešimir III and Gojslav, who were previously allies of Bulgaria, accepted Basil's supremacy in order to avoid the same fate as Bulgaria; the emperor warmly received their offers of vassalage and awarded them the honorary title of patrician.
Later Years
Basil II returned in triumph to Constantinople, then promptly went east and attacked the Georgian Kingdom of Tao-Klarjeti. He later secured the annexation of the sub-kingdoms of Armenia along with a promise that its capital and surrounding regions would be willed to Byzantium following the death of its king Hovhannes-Smbat. In 1021, he also secured the cession of the Kingdom of Vaspurakan by its king, Seneqerim-John, in exchange for estates in Sebasteia. Basil created in those highlands a strongly fortified frontier, which, if his successors had been capable, should have proved an effective barrier against the invasions of the Seljuk Turks. In the meantime, other Byzantine forces restored much of Southern Italy, lost over the previous 150 years.
Basil was preparing a military expedition to recover the island of Sicily when he died, on 15 December 1025. Basil was to be buried in the last sarcophagus available in the rotunda of Constantine I in the Church of the Holy Apostles. However, he had later asked his brother and successor Constantine VIII to be buried in the Church of St. John the Theologian (i.e. the Evangelist), at the Hebdomon Palace complex, outside the walls of Constantinople. The epitaph on his tomb celebrated Basil's campaigns and victories. During the pillage of 1204, Basil's grave was desecrated by the invading Crusaders of the Fourth Crusade.
Legacy
The Byzantine Empire at the death of Basil II in 1025
Basil was a stocky man of less than average stature who, nevertheless, cut a majestic figure on horseback. He had light blue eyes and strongly arched eyebrows; in later life his beard became scant but his sidewhiskers were luxuriant and he had a habit of rolling his whiskers between his fingers when deep in thought or angry. He was not a fluent speaker and had a loud laugh that convulsed his whole frame. As a mature man he had ascetic tastes and cared little for the pomp and ceremony of the Imperial court, typically holding court dressed in military regalia. Still, he was a capable administrator, who, uniquely among the soldier-emperors, left a full treasury upon his death.
He was worshipped by his army, as he spent most of his reign campaigning with them instead of sending orders from the distant palaces of Constantinople, as had most of his predecessors. He lived the life of a soldier to the point of eating the same daily rations as any other member of the army. Besides being called the "Father of the Army", he was also popular with country farmers.
The Byzantine Empire under Basil II probably had a population of about 18 million people. By 1025, Basil II (with an annual revenue of 7,000,000 nomismata) was able to amass 14,400,000 nomismata (or 200,000 pounds of gold) for the Imperial treasury due to his prudent management.
@The Human Q-Tip @TopGun @Marcus
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Richard the Lionheart
I think this guy was one of the most "modern" generals of the Middle Ages. Very much a pure professional, which was rare considering the time. Excelled as a strategist, as a tactical commander, and as a logistician, and personally designed one of the finest fortresses ever build -- Chateau Galliard.
Richard I (8 September 1157 – 6 April 1199) was King of England from 6 July 1189 until his death. He also ruled as Duke of Normandy, Aquitaine and Gascony, Lord of Cyprus, Count of Poitiers, Anjou, Maine, and Nantes, and Overlord of Brittany at various times during the same period. He was known as Richard Cœur de Lion or Richard the Lionheart because of his reputation as a great military leader and warrior. He was also known in Occitan as Oc e No (Yes and No), because of his reputation for terseness.
By the age of 16, Richard had taken command of his own army, putting down rebellions in Poitou against his father. Richard was a central Christian commander during the Third Crusade, leading the campaign after the departure of Philip II of France and scoring considerable victories against his Muslim counterpart, Saladin, although he did not retake Jerusalem from Saladin. The key battle of the campaign was at Arsuf, and a perfect example of his excellence as a general.
Battle of Arsuf
Prelude
Following the capture of Acre in 1191, Richard was aware that he needed to capture the port of Jaffa before making an attempt on Jerusalem, Richard began to march down the coast from Acre towards Jaffa in August 1191. Saladin, whose main objective was to prevent the recapture of Jerusalem, mobilised his army to attempt to stop the Crusaders' advance. Richard organized the advance with attention to detail. A large part of the Egyptian fleet had been captured at the fall of Acre, and with no threat from this quarter he could march south along the coast with the sea always protecting his right flank.[4]
Mindful of the lessons of the disaster at Hattin, Richard knew that his army's greatest need was water and that heat exhaustion was its greatest danger. Although pressed for time he proceeded at a relatively slow pace. He marched his army only in the morning before the heat of the day, making frequent rest stops, always beside sources of water. The fleet sailed down the coast in close support, a source of supplies and a refuge for the wounded. Aware of the ever-present danger of enemy raiders and the possibility of hit-and-run attacks, he kept the column in tight formation with a core of twelve mounted regiments, each with a hundred knights. The infantry marched on the landward flank, covering the flanks of the horsemen and affording them some protection from missiles. The outermost ranks of the infantry were composed of crossbowmen. On the seaward side was the baggage and also units of infantry being rested from the continuous harassment inflicted by Saladin's forces. Richard wisely rotated his infantry units to keep them relatively fresh.
Though provoked and tormented by the skirmish tactics of Saladin's archers, Richard's generalship ensured that order and discipline were maintained under the most difficult of circumstances. Baha al-Din ibn Shaddad, the Muslim chronicler and eyewitness, describes the march:
"The Moslems discharged arrows at them from all sides to annoy them, and force them to charge: but in this they were unsuccessful. These men exercised wonderful self-control; they went on their way without any hurry, whilst their ships followed their line of march along the coast, and in this manner they reached their halting-place."
Battle:
At dawn on 7 September 1191, as Richard's forces began moving out of camp enemy scouts were visible in all directions, hinting that Saladin's whole army lay hidden in the woodland. King Richard took especial pains over the disposition of his army. The probable posts of greatest danger, at the front and especially the rear of the column, were given to the military orders. They had the most experience of fighting in the East, were arguably the most disciplined, and were the only formations which included Turcopole cavalry who fought like the Turkish horse archers of the Ayyubid army. Richard's army likely was outnumbered by 3-1.
The van of the Crusader army consisted of the Knights Templar under Robert de Sablé. They were followed by three units composed of Richard's own subjects, the Angevins and Bretons, then the Poitevins including Guy of Lusignan, titular King of Jerusalem, and lastly the English and Normans who had charge of the great standard mounted on its waggon. The next seven corps were made up of the French, the Flemmings, the barons of Outremer and small contingents of crusaders from other lands. Forming the rearguard were the Knights Hospitaller led by Garnier de Nablus. The twelve corps were organised into five larger formations, though their precise distribution is unknown. Additionally, a small troop, under the leadership of Henry II of Champagne, was detached to scout towards the hills, and a squadron of picked knights under King Richard and Hugh of Burgundy, the leader of the French contingent, was detailed to ride up and down the column checking on Saladin's movements and ensuring that their own ranks were kept in order.
The first Saracen attack did not come until all the crusaders had left their camp and were moving towards Arsuf. The Ayyubid army then burst out of the woodland. The front of the army was composed of dense swarms of skirmishers, both horse and foot, Bedouin, Sudanese archers and the lighter types of Turkish horse archers. Behind these were the ordered squadrons of armoured heavy cavalry: Saladin's mamluks (also termed ghulams), Kurdish troops, and the contingents of the emirs and princes of Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia. The army was divided into three parts, left and right wings and centre. Saladin directed his army from beneath his banners, surrounded by his bodyguard and accompanied by his kettle-drummers.
In an attempt to destroy the cohesion of the Crusader army and unsettle their resolve, the Ayyubid onslaught was accompanied by the clashing of cymbals and gongs, trumpets blowing and men screaming war-cries.
"In truth, our people, so few in number, were hemmed in by the multitudes of the Saracens, that they had no means of escape, if they tried; neither did they seem to have valour sufficient to withstand so many foes, nay, they were shut in, like a flock of sheep in the jaws of wolves, with nothing but the sky above, and the enemy all around them."
The repeated Ayyubid harrying attacks followed the same pattern: the Bedouin and Nubians on foot launched arrows and javelins into the enemy lines, before parting to allow the mounted archers to advance, attack and wheel off, a well-practiced technique. Crusader crossbowmen responded, when this was possible, although the chief task among the Crusaders was simply to preserve their ranks in the face of sustained provocation. When the incessant attacks of skirmishers failed to have the desired effect, the weight of the attack was switched to the rear of the Crusader column, with the Hospitallers coming under the greatest pressure. Here the right wing of the Ayyubid army made a desperate attack on the squadron of Hospitaller knights and the infantry corps covering them. The Hospitallers could be attacked from both their rear and flank. Many of the Hospitaller infantry had to walk backwards in order to keep their faces, and shields, to the enemy.
All Saladin's best efforts could not dislocate the Crusader column, or halt its advance in the direction of Arsuf. Richard was determined to hold his army together, forcing the enemy to exhaust themselves in repeated charges, with the intention of holding his knights for a concentrated counter-attack at just the right moment. There were risks in this, because the army was not only marching under severe enemy provocation, but the troops were suffering from heat and thirst. Just as serious, the Saracens were killing so many horses that some of Richard's own knights began to wonder if a counter-strike would be possible. Many of the unhorsed knights joined the infantry.
Just as the vanguard entered Arsuf in the middle of the afternoon, the Hospitaller crossbowmen to the rear were having to load and fire walking backwards. Inevitably they lost cohesion, and the enemy was quick to take advantage of this opportunity, moving into any gap wielding their swords and maces. For the Crusaders, the Battle of Arsuf had now entered a critical stage. Garnier de Nablus repeatedly pleaded with Richard to be allowed to attack. He was refused, the Master was ordered to maintain position and await the signal for a general assault, six clear trumpet blasts. Richard knew that the charge of his knights needed to be reserved until the Ayyubid army was fully committed, closely engaged, and the Saracens' horses had begun to tire. Goaded beyond endurance, the Master and another knight, Baldwin de Carron, thrust their way through their own infantry and charged into the Saracen ranks with a cry of “St. George!”; they were then followed by the rest of the Hospitaller knights. Moved by this example, the French knights of the corps immediately preceding the Hospitallers also charged.
The precipitate action of the Hospitallers could have caused Richard's whole strategy to unravel. However, he recognized that the counterattack, once started, had to be supported by all his army and ordered the signal for a general charge to be sounded. The Frankish infantry opened gaps in their ranks for the knights to pass through and the attack naturally developed in echelon from the rear to the van. To the soldiers of Saladin's army, as Baha al-Din noted, the sudden change from passivity to ferocious activity on the part of the Crusaders was disconcerting, and appeared to be the result of a preconceived plan.
Having already been engaged in close combat with the rear of the Crusader column, the right wing of the Ayyubid army was in compact formation and too close to their enemy to avoid the full impact of the charge. As a result, they suffered great numbers of casualties, the knights taking a bloody revenge for all they had had to endure earlier in the battle. Baha al-Din noted that "the rout was complete." He had been in the centre division of Saladin's army, when it turned in flight he looked to join the left wing, but found that it also was in rapid flight. Noting the disintegration of the right wing he finally sought Saladin's personal banners, but found only seventeen members of the bodyguard and a lone drummer still with them.
Being aware that an over-rash pursuit was the greatest danger when fighting armies trained in the fluid tactics of the Turks, Richard halted the charge after about 1 mile (1.6 km) had been covered. The right flank Crusader units, which had formed the van of the column, including the English and Normans had not yet been heavily engaged in close combat, and they formed a reserve on which the rest regrouped. Freed from the pressure of being actively pursued, many of the Ayyubid troops turned to cut down those of the knights who had unwisely drawn ahead of the rest. Once their squadrons were back in order, Richard led his knights in a second charge and the forces of Saladin broke once again.
Alert to the danger presented to his scattered ranks, Richard, prudent as ever, halted and regrouped his forces once more after a further pursuit. The Ayyubid cavalry turned once again, showing they still had stomach to renew the fight. However, a third and final charge caused them to scatter into the woodland where they dispersed into the hills in all directions, showing no inclination to continue the conflict. Richard led his cavalry back to Arsuf where the infantry had pitched camp. During the night the Saracen dead were looted
Aftermath
As always with medieval battles, losses are difficult to assess with any precision. The Christian chroniclers claim that Saladin's force lost 32 emirs and 7,000 men, but it is possible that the true number may have been fewer. Baha al-Din mentions only three deaths amongst the leaders of the Ayyubid army: Musek, Grand-Emir of the Kurds, Kaimaz el Adeli and Lighush. King Richard's own dead are said to have numbered no more than 700. The only Crusader leader of note to be killed was James d'Avesnes.[43][44]
Arsuf was an important victory. The Ayyubid army was not destroyed, despite the considerable casualties it suffered, but it did rout; this was considered shameful by the Muslims and boosted the morale of the Crusaders. A contemporary opinion stated that, had Richard been able to choose the moment to unleash his knights, rather than having to react to the actions of an insubordinate unit commander, the Crusader victory might have been much more effective. Possibly being so complete a victory that it would have disabled Saladin's forces for a long time.[45][46] After the rout Saladin was able to regroup and attempted to resume his skirmishing method of warfare but to little effect; shaken by the Crusaders' sudden and devastatingly effective counterattack at Arsuf, he was no longer willing to risk a further full-scale attack. Arsuf had dented Saladin's reputation as an invincible warrior, and proved Richard's courage as a soldier and his skill as a commander. Richard was able to take, defend and hold Jaffa – a strategically crucial move toward securing Jerusalem. Also Saladin had to evacuate and demolish most of the fortresses of southern Palestine: Ascalon, Gaza, Blanche-Garde, Lydda and Ramleh, as he realised he could not hold them. Richard took the fortress of Darum, the sole fortress that Saladin had garrisoned, with only his own household troops, so low had Saracen morale been reduced. By depriving Saladin of the coast, Richard seriously threatened Saladin's hold on Jerusalem.[47][48]
Although the Third Crusade, in the end, failed to retake Jerusalem, a three-year truce was eventually negotiated with Saladin. The truce, known as the Treaty of Jaffa, ensured that Christian pilgrims from the west would once again be allowed to visit Jerusalem. Saladin also recognised the Crusaders' control of the Levantine coast as far south as Jaffa. Both sides had become exhausted by the struggle, Richard needed to return to Europe in order to protect his patrimony from the aggression of Philip of France, and Palestine was in a ruinous state.
Richard, Cœur de Lion is a great paradox I think. He is amongst the greatest of Warrior Kings. A general without peer, and a man so brave he took a city outnumbered 10-1 running through the surf in full armor against an entrenched enemy.
But, he was a bad King of England. By spending so much time in the Outremer, he allowed John to wreck the Kingdom and he never found time to sire an heir. Of which there is much speculation that he joins many of great historical generals as being far from the stereotypical mincing homosexual (see Alexander, Caesar, Trajan, Karl XII, Frederick etc., etc.).
If Richard was incarnated it was in the form of Karl XII; brilliant general whose victories could not overcome the shortcomings of their administration.
But what a duel. Has history ever recorded such a match between brilliant leaders as that between Saladin (a Kurd by the way) and Richard?
P.S.
Fuck the Fourth Crusade. In every way, they utterly fucked the West with regard to the Turks on top of the brutal destruction of 3000 years of classical civilization.
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Richard truly was a horrible King, but purely as a general, the man seemed ahead of his time. He seemed to have used the subordinate commanders of that polygot army almost as a staff, and as a result, it had much more cohesion and discipline than it had any right to have And his understanding and command over logistics was truly exceptional. I think he's a guy you could have dropped into the 20th century, and he'd have excelled commanding modern armies.
And yeah, the Fourth Crusade was a horror show, and a historical disaster for the West.
Surprised it hasn't been commented on (maybe I'm in wrong thread?) but a US Navy jet shot down an Assad fighter jet in Syria today.
The Syrian planes attacked a ground based US coalition of troops, so the US plane was brought in to serve as protection. Our ground troops were getting close to an ISIS compound.
Just interesting.....I'm a bit surprised Assad has the balls to push back on ground troops knowing we've got ships waiting in the sea to blow his shit up....
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/0...hter-jets-after-attack-on-partner-forces.html
The Syrian planes attacked a ground based US coalition of troops, so the US plane was brought in to serve as protection. Our ground troops were getting close to an ISIS compound.
Just interesting.....I'm a bit surprised Assad has the balls to push back on ground troops knowing we've got ships waiting in the sea to blow his shit up....
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/0...hter-jets-after-attack-on-partner-forces.html
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